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Economic value is created by the efficient allocation of an economy’s capi- 
tal. Much  of many countries’ capital is  proffered to corporations con- 
trolled by a small number of very wealthy families. This could be desirable 
if these families provide optimal corporate management. This paper raises 
the possibility that the currently observed allocation of corporate control 
may in fact be suboptimal in such countries. 
The basic finding of this paper is  that countries in which billionaire 
heirs’ wealth is large relative to GDP grow more slowly than other coun- 
tries at similar levels of development while countries in which self-made 
entrepreneur billionaire wealth is large relative to GDP grow more rapidly 
than other countries at similar levels of development. We consider several 
explanations for this finding. First, old wealth may entrench poor manage- 
ment, and control pyramids may distort their incentives. Second, a sharply 
skewed wealth distribution may create market power in capital markets, 
causing inefficiency. Third, entrenched billionaires have a vested interest 
in preserving the value of old capital and thus in slowing creative destruc- 
tion. Fourth, old money becomes entrenched through control of the politi- 
cal system and, most especially, by rearing barriers to capital mobility. In 
contrast, substantial self-made billionaires’ wealth is observed where such 
forces are ineffectual and creative destruction occurs. 
Randall K. Morck is the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at 
the University of Alberta, Edmonton. David A. Stangeland is associate professor of finance 
at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg. Bernard Yeung is the Krasnoff Professor of Inter- 
national Business and professor of economics at New York University. 
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We  use micro-level evidence to support or refute these macro-level ex- 
planations.  Canadian data are useful for this purpose because the large 
firms in that country exhibit a large range of ownership structures, with 
billionaire-controlled and widely held firms both abundant enough for sta- 
tistical analyses. Also, the Canada-US. free trade agreement causes a use- 
ful regime change that generates testable predictions of our proposed ex- 
planations. 
Our evidence is consistent  with corporate control by  heirs leading to 
slow growth because of inefficiency due to entrenched corporate control, 
capital market power, high barriers against outside investment, and per- 
haps  also low investment in innovation.  We  hypothesize that this  “Ca- 
nadian disease” may be a generalizable  explanation of  our basic cross- 
country finding. Obviously, further investigation into micro-level data for 
other countries is called for. 
11.1  The Ownership Structure of Countries 
Table 11.1 displays the 1993 wealth of Forbes 1,000 billionaire residents 
by country of residence and scaled by  1993 GDP.’ Our sample was con- 
structed as follows. We began with all countries having 1997 GDP  greater 
than U.S.$1 billion.  We  drop all postsocialist  countries,  such as China, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia; all countries currently 
subject to economic sanctions, such as Cuba, Iran, and Iraq; the oil sheik- 
doms Bahrein and Brunei; the tax havens Liechtenstein and Luxembourg; 
Ethiopia,  Kuwait, and Lebanon,  which  are undergoing  postwar recon- 
struction; Sri Lanka and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which 
are currently experiencing civil war; and Bangladesh, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tan- 
zania, and the United Arab Emirates because of missing data. 
The final sample contains Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,  Hong Kong,  Iceland,  India,  Indonesia,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, the Phil- 
ippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United  States, and 
Venezuela. 
In  subsequent  econometric work, we  drop the United  States and the 
1. Unfortunately, most studies of economic inequality focus on income distribution rather 
than wealth distribution. The typical finding is that economic growth is slower in countries 
with  more uneven  income distribution  (Fishlow  1996; Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot  1995). 
Wealth-based Gini coefficients appear to be unavailable. We therefore take a practical ap- 
proach and construct our own proxy for wealth, or capital ownership, concentration. As an 
innovation in  1997, Forbes included political dynasties ranging from the Suhartos to the 
Windsors in its billionaire list. For the few countries in which these families are present, we 
use 1997 family wealth. Our results are robust to dropping or including these families. Table 11.1  Billionaires and Billionaire Wealth by Country and by Source of Wealth 
Millions in Wealth over Billions of GDP 
Probable  Political 
Billionaires  Total  Entrepreneur  Heir  Heir  Entrepreneur  Family 
per Million  Billionaire  Billionaire  Billionaire  Billionaire  and Heir  Billionaire 

































































































































































95.238 Table 11.1  (continued) 
Millions in Wealth over Billions of GDP 
Probable  Political 
Billionaires  Total  Entrepreneur  Heir  Heir  Entrepreneur  Family 
per Million  Billionaire  Billionaire  Billionaire  Billionaire  and Heir  Billionaire 









































































































































































Source: Forbes 1,000 list of the world’s richest people, 1993 Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  323 
United  Kingdom from our sample on the grounds that their corporate 
ownership structures are highly atypical, in that their large listed compa- 
nies are predominantly directly held by small shareholders (La Porta et al. 
1997). We leave them in table 11.1 since they provide useful benchmarks 
for wealth-concentration  comparisons. 
There is a remarkable degree of variation. The average billionaire wealth 
is 13.3 percent of GDP  for the East Asian economies: Korea, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. 
Hong Kong  is  the  least  egalitarian  of  these,  with  billionaires  holding 
wealth equal to 36 percent of its GDP. The average for Latin American 
countries in our sample is 4.5 percent, with Mexican billionaires’ wealth 
the highest, at 12.8 percent of GDP. Billionaires are less important in rich 
countries, where the average is 2.4 percent. The least egalitarian rich coun- 
tries are Greece, Switzerland, and Sweden, with billionaire wealth of 13.3, 
7.7, and 5.6 percent of GDP, respectively. This contrasts with 1.1 percent 
for the United Kingdom, 4 percent for Canada, and  just under 4 percent for 
the United States. 
Large as they are, these numbers greatly understate the importance of 
wealthy  families  in  most  economies.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and 
Shleifer (1999) show  that  pyramid  ownership  structures are ubiquitous 
outside the United States and the United Kingdom. In a pyramid owner- 
ship structure, a wealthy family controls assets worth vastly more than 
its own wealth by holding controlling interests in companies, which hold 
controlling  interests in other companies,  which in turn hold controlling 
interests in still more companies. A control pyramid ten layers high, with 
51 percent ownership at each level, magnifies a billion dollars of wealth 
into control over $840 billion ($1 billion/0.5 1  lo)  worth of corporate assets. 
Intercorporate cross-holdings and the use of supervoting shares for insid- 
ers and nonvoting shares for outsiders in many countries further extend 
and strengthen billionaires’ control. An example of a fortune extended in 
this way is that of the Wallenberg family of Sweden. Although their actual 
wealth fails to get them onto Forbes’ billionaire list, the firms that they 
control  through  a  mixture  of  pyramids,  cross-holdings,  and multiple- 
voting  shares constitute 40 percent  of the market value of the Swedish 
stock exchange (Strom  1996). Similarly, firms  in the estate of  “Lucho” 
Naboa provide  the incomes of  about 3 million  of Ecuador’s  11 million 
people. The family’s banana operations alone, which account for 40 per- 
cent of Ecuador’s banana exports, generate about 5 percent of the coun- 
try’s GDP (De Cordoba 1995). Yet billionaire wealth for Ecuador is zero 
in table 11.1 since the family’s actual wealth is less than $1 billion. If we 
conservatively take pyramids as multiplying a billionaire family’s wealth 
into control over assets worth ten times as much, billionaire control av- 
erages  133 percent  of GDP in East Asia, 45 percent  of GDP in  Latin 
America, and 24 percent of GDP in the OECD countries (although this 324  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
calculation is not applicable in the United  Kingdom and, especially, the 
United States, where control pyramids are seldom used). 
11.2  Entrepreneurs, Inherited Wealth, and Economic Growth 
Should the ownership structure of  a nation> capital, in this context, the 
capital controlled by different types of billionaires, matter? There are nu- 
merous reasons to think that it might. 
Building a fortune and passing it down to one’s descendants might be 
a powerful motivation for prospective entrepreneurs to build great busi- 
nesses. Wealthy heirs have the resources and incentives  to monitor cor- 
porate managers carefully  and so might  improve corporate governance. 
Powerful  families, whose  fortunes are tied  to their nation’s economies, 
might lobby politicians to enact economically rational policies and might 
be more successful at this than small atomistic businessmen. Wealthy fam- 
ilies might act to safeguard competitive and efficient capital markets and 
institutions. Wealthy families also have the security and the resources to 
bankroll innovation. Any or all of  these factors could lead to a positive 
relation between economic growth and billionaire wealth. 
However, a negative relation is also plausible a priori. Since intelligence 
is thought to be, at best, only partly inherited, an entrepreneur’s descen- 
dants should regress steadily toward average talent with each new genera- 
tion. If they value the control that pyramids and the like bestow on them, 
they become entrenched, mediocre managers. Their magnified control of 
capital may also let wealthy families shape prices in capital markets to 
further their own welfare at the expense of their countries. Also, with their 
wealth tied up in existing capital, wealthy families may be loath to finance 
innovations for fear that the ensuing creative destruction might get out of 
their control. Finally, their corporate control may give billionaire families 
economies of scale in political rent seeking and thereby divert public re- 
sources to their private goals, again to the detriment of their countries. 
1  1.2.1  Observation 
The actual relation between a country’s capital ownership structure and 
economic growth is therefore an important but unexplored empirical ques- 
tion. To  address this question, we run standard economic-growth regres- 
sions of the sort described by Mankiw (1 995), with an extra term at the end: 
Our dependent variable is economic growth, defined as the average growth 
rate in real GDP, r; averaged over 1994, 1995, and 1996. The independent 
variables in such regressions generally include the logarithm of each coun- Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  325 
try’s 1994 per capita GD8  In( YIL);  a physical capital accumulation rate, 
IIK, where I is capital investment and K is the existing capital stock; and 
a measure of human capital, the logarithm of the average years of educa- 
tion, ln(E). Our data on investment rates and education levels are for 1990 
and 1985, respectively, and come from the World Bank Growth Data used 
by, for example, Barro and Lee (1996). 
To these we  add C, a variable or set of variables describing the capital 
controlled by  different types of  billionaires in each country. We  use the 
wealth and the sources of wealth of each country’s billionaires to construct 
these variables. An alternative approach would be to use wealth Gini co- 
efficients. However, our research question is more about the type of wealthy 
people in a country than about the degree of wealth concentration per se. 
Another alternative approach would be based on the fractional ownership 
in each country’s largest corporations. But this approach focuses on the 
billionaire’s equity stakes as a fraction of firm value, rather than on their 
wealth as a fraction of the country’s wealth, and so is less useful for our 
purposes. 
We consider two basic types of billionaires, based on Forbes magazine’s 
description of each billionaire and on additional information from Who  Z 
Who. The first is self-made business entrepreneurs. These are people who 
built huge fortunes from nothing or virtually nothing. We define B to be 
the total wealth of a country’s self-made business entrepreneurs and scale 
this by  GDP, denoted  Z:  We  thus add BIY to the regression described in 
(1) as the first component of C. 
The second sort of billionaire we call heirs. We define their total wealth 
in each country to be H and again scale by GDP, thus adding HIY as the 
second component of C in the regression described in (1). We have several 
alternative measures of this variable. We  divide billionaires who are not 
self-made into different categories. Some are clearly not billionaires be- 
cause of their entrepreneurial talents. These include heirs to great business 
fortunes and political  dynasties. These we  call heirs.  Other billionaires 
have inherited  substantial fortunes but greatly increased them. We  call 
them heir-entrepreneurs. The remaining we classify as probably heirs. This 
category includes fortunes that appear to be controlled jointly by  self- 
made billionaires and their heirs. This wealth is presumably in the process 
of being transferred across generations. It also includes some fortunes that 
we  are simply unable to classify clearly because of inadequate documen- 
tation. 
In table 1 1.2, we consider alternative measures of heir fortunes that in- 
clude different subsets of the categories given above. Our first measure, 
H,,  is the wealth of heirs to business fortunes and political dynasties. The 
second, H,, is HI  plus the wealth of probably heirs. The third measure, H3, 
is H, plus heir-entrepreneurs.  Finally, H, is HI  plus probably heirs and 
heir-entrepreneurs. The measures H,-H,  replicate HI-H4,  respectively, but Table 11.2  The Cross-country Relation between Economic Growth and Capital Ownership Structure Controlling for Current per Capita Income, 
Capital Investment Rate, and Level of Education 
lnterccpt 
Log of per capita 
GDP: In( YIL) 
Capital accumulation 
rate: IIK 




over GDP: BIY 
Billionaire-heir wealth 



























































Definition of Heir“ 
R2  ,519  ,488  ,531  ,489  ,545  .49  1  ,536  .49  1 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed t-test probability levels for rejecting a zero coeficient. Coefficients in boldface are statistically significant at 90 
percent confidence or more. Sample of 39 countries consists of the countries listed in table  1  1.1 above minus the United Kingdom and the United States. 
“H,  includes only the wealth of billionaires known positively to be heirs, politicians, or politicians’ relations. H2  also includes the wealth of billionaires who 
are probably heirs. H,  includes HI,  plus fortunes jointly controlled by a founder and his heirs. ti, includes all the above. H,-H,  are analogous to HI,  Hz,  HI, 
and H, but do  not include politician billionaires and their relations. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  327 
exclude political dynasties. All eight measures give remarkably similar re- 
sults.2 In subsequent tables, we measure heir billionaire wealth by  H,,  for- 
tunes clearly due to either inheritances or political dynasties. We use this 
measure to minimize the likelihood of contaminating our heir wealth vari- 
able with any fortunes that might be controlled by business entrepreneurs. 
However, this choice turns out to be unimportant: all the analyses in sub- 
sequent tables are qualitatively similar if other definitions of heir are used. 
Table 11.2 confirms previous findings that countries tend to have higher 
rates of economic growth if their initial per capita GDP is low,  if  their 
capital accumulation rates are high, and (more tenuously) if their general 
level of education is high. Our added variables reveal a clear pattern. Eco- 
nomic growth is positively associated with self-made billionaire wealth but 
negatively associated with billionaire heir wealth. We emphasize that this 
is after controlling for per capita GDP, the rate of capital accumulation, 
and education. 
The effect is economically, as well as statistically, significant. The aver- 
age rate of GDP  growth in our sample is 4.16 percent per year. Since the 
coefficient on heir billionaire wealth  over GDP in the first regression  is 
-  .292, going from zero billionaire heir wealth to the seventy-fifth percen- 
tile, 3.293 percent of GDP, is associated with a slowdown of 0.962 percent 
per year, and heir wealth at the ninetieth percentile, 6.667 percent, corre- 
sponds to a growth slowdown of 1.95 percent per year. 
11.2.2  Further Exploration 
In the following sections, we consider different possible mechanisms by 
which  heir  wealth might  affect economic  growth  and consider  whether 
each, in  turn, might  be empirically rejected.  To explore their empirical 
validity, we utilize firm-level data for Canada. That country is ideal for our 
purposes because large Canadian firms exhibit a wide range of ownership 
structures, with enough firms in each category to allow statistical analyses. 
Firm-level accounting data in Canada are also readily available and reli- 
able. Finally, the United States and Canada are, in most aspects, very simi- 
lar countries. Although natural  resources account  for a larger  share of 
Canada’s GDP, its resources industries  and those of  the United  States 
are not dissimilar. The two economies have broadly similar factor endow- 
ments and employ virtually identical  technology  and human capital in 
similar institutional frameworks. Their corporate sectors differ markedly 
only in that  the ownership structures of their largest firms are radically 
different. Thus, the U.S. economy provides a useful benchmark. 
Table 11.3 displays the ownership structure of the 246 publicly traded 
firms in the list of the top 500 Canadian firms by sales in 1988, as reported 
2. Heir-entrepreneur wealth, probably heir wealth, and political dynasty wealth, treated 
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Table 11.3  Publicly Traded Firms among the Largest 500 Canadian Firms by 
Sales, by  Type of Controlling Shareholder 
Type of 
Controlling Shareholder* 
Average  Fraction of 
Firmsh  Salesc  Total Sales 
Heir, direct or via pyramid 
Business entrepreneur, direct or via 
No controlling shareholder 
Controlled by  widely held Canadian 
parent, direct or via pyramid 
Other individual or family, type 
unclear 
Financial institution or investment 
fund 

































246d  1.02  1  .oo 
Note: Sample is firms in the 1988 Financial Post 500 for which accounting and ownership 
data are available. 
dA  controlling shareholder, under Canadian law, is anyone who controls more than 20 per- 
cent voting powers. Where there is more than one controlling shareholder, the firm is classi- 
fied according to the type of the largest shareholder. 
hCanadian  reporting requirements allow consolidated financial reports for corporate groups. 
Consequently, the number of firms is understated. 
<The  number of firms and average sales are for those firms with reported sales in  1988 and 
accounting data for the variables used in tables 11.4 and 11.5. (Firms not reporting firm age 
are included.) Sales are for 1988 and are in billions of U.S. dollars. 
dOf the 500 largest firms, 254 are privately held, so no details of the ownership structure 
are available. 
in the Financial Post Surveys for that year. (We use 1988 data here because 
free trade with the United States changed the corporate landscape subse- 
quent to that. We  return to these changes below.) We  follow Canadian 
corporate governance laws and define a controlling shareholder as anyone 
with a stake that bestows 20 percent voting power or more. This is a re- 
strictive definition of control by U.S. standards, where much smaller stakes 
are thought sufficient to allow control. 
Only 53 of the largest 246 public Canadian firms are widely held by this 
definition. This figure rises to 67 if publicly traded subsidiaries, subsidiar- 
ies of subsidiaries, and so on of widely held firms are added. The average 
stake of the largest shareholder is about 50 per~ent.~  This contrasts starkly 
3. The degree of concentration of Canadian ownership is greatly understated because the 
other 254 firms in the top 500 list are privately held and so must be dropped from our sample 
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with the United States, where Demsetz and Lehn (1  985) report that the com- 
bined holdings of the largest five shareholders average less than 25 percent. 
We proceed by dissecting Canadian firm-level data to see whether our 
explanations apply to that country. Obviously, firm-level analyses in other 
countries are needed before reliable generalizations are warranted. We also 
recognize that this leaves the issue of causality open, as future researchers 
may consider other mechanisms than those that we have evaluated. 
11.3  Inherited Wealth and Corporate Control 
In the United States, firms whose boards are dominated by a controlling 
family are beginning to attract the attention of corporate-governance crit- 
ics. Referring to family-dominated public companies, Jon Lukomnik, the 
deputy controller for pensions of New York City, commented: “When you 
look at really abusive companies, you tend to find them” (“Boards Cut 
Out of Family Trees” 1996). U.S. family firms recently targeted by share- 
holder  rights activists include Ethyl Corporation, where chairman  and 
CEO Bruce Gottwald’s 17.7 percent stake brings directorships for his two 
sons, a brother, and a nephew. Archer Daniel Midlands, Paccar Inc., the 
New  York Times,  and the Gap have attracted similar attention (“Boards 
Cut Out of Family Trees” 1996). 
Stulz (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) develop theoretical frame- 
works describing how corporate governance might suffer when U.S. firms 
are unable to throw off substandard but entrenched managers. In this sec- 
tion, we argue that such problems may be many times worse in other econ- 
omies. 
11.3.1 
Outside the United States, moneyed families often leverage their wealth 
into control over corporate assets worth far more. La Porta, Lopez-de- 
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) show that this is achieved primarily through 
the use of controlpyrumids. An example of a control pyramid is the group 
of firms controlled by the Canadian billionaires Edward and Peter Bronf- 
man. They own Broncorp Inc., which controls HIL Corporation with a 
19.6  percent equity stake. HIL owns 97 percent of Edper Resources, which 
owns 60 percent of Brascan Holdings, which owns 5.1 percent of Brascan, 
which owns 49.9 percent of Braspower Holdings, which owns 49.3 percent 
of Great Lakes Power Inc., which owns 100 percent of First Toronto In- 
vestments, which owns 25 percent of Trilon Holdings, which owns 64.5 
percent of Trilon Financial, which owns 4 1.4 percent of Gentra, which 
owns  31.9  percent  of  Imperial  Windsor  Group  (Directory of  Inter- 
Corporate Ownership, various issues). The Bronfmans’ actual equity stake 
in Imperial Windsor works out to 0.03 percent, yet they have full control 
of it and of all the other firms in the pyramid above and beside it. This is 
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because they either own more than 50 percent of the stock at each stage 
or control more than 50 percent of the votes via supervoting shares, inter- 
corporate cross-holdings, or other arrangements that reduce the minimum 
size of a control stake. This branch of the Bronfman family controls several 
hundred firms in this way (Directory of Inter-Corporate Ownership 1998). 
More formally, a simplified control pyramid  can be thought  of as an 
arrangement where a wealthy family owns fraction a E  (0, 1) of firm A, 
which owns fraction a of firms B,, which each own fraction a of firms C,, 
and so on. 
Such a control pyramid leverages a family’s wealth, w,  into control over 
corporate assets, p,  worth many times more. For example, let firm A be 
worth $1  million. It owns fraction a of each of the $1 million firms B, and 
B2. Firm B, then owns fraction a  of the $1 million firms C, and C,,  and 
firm B,  owns a of C, and C,.  These can then own eight firms worth $1 
million each, and these in turn can own sixteen  $1  million firms. If one 
vote per share of stock is used, a must exceed 50 percent. If differential 
voting shares, intercorporate shareholdings, or other irregularities are al- 
lowed, a can be much lower, and the rate at which divergence of ownership 
from control grows with each additional layer is larger. 
If fractional ownership a is required for control, the value of the assets 
under a family’s control is p,  and the family’s wealth is w, 
(2)  63  =  Aw, 




As  -. 
For example, if a is 1/3 and a family used a six-layer pyramid to control 
its actual physical assets, it can leverage $1 billion of wealth into control 
over 36 or $729 billion in corporate  asset^.^ 
11.3.2  Billionaires’ Objectives and Public Share Value 
Pyramids generate a divergence of interests between controlling share- 
holders  and other shareholders analogous to that  noted by  Jensen  and 
Meckling (1  976) between managers and shareholders, but more extreme. 
Jensen and Meckling showed that, if a manager who owns fraction a E [0, 
13  of an equity-financed firm’s stock destroys $1  .OO  worth  of corporate 
assets to receive personal benefits worth y E  [0, 11, he is better off as long 
as y > a. 
4.  In practice, a may be different in each level of the pyramid and in each chain of control. 
A more general formula for the pyramid multiplier of  the control chain {a,,,  a2,,  . . . ,  an, 
linking firm j to the family firm n levels above is A’  = [Il:=,a”]-’,  and the analogue of eq. (2) 
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In a pyramid, the divergence between control and actual ownership is 
potentially much worse than in Jensen and Meckling’s example. The diver- 
gence is essentially compounded once for each pyramid level that sepa- 
rates the firm in question from the family firm that holds ultimate control. 
The family’s welfare is advanced when it spends $1 .OO of corporate wealth 
in a pyramid company it controls to gain y < 1 in personal benefits if y 
> a”.  Again, differential voting shares, golden shares, and other devices 
allow control to be exercised with a << 50 percent at each level, so the 
divergence of ownership from control rights can be  even more extreme. 
Since a” approaches zero as n becomes large, value-destroying consump- 
tion of corporate resources becomes more attractive as the number of lev- 
els in the control pyramid rises5 
Examples of  such consumption  of  corporate resources are abundant. 
Controlling families may confiscate corporate property for their personal 
use. They may interfere in corporate decision making to benefit themselves 
or their friends, to advance pet projects, or to push political goals. They 
may use transfer pricing to shift income from publicly traded firms they 
control to private firms they own outright, from firms low in control pyra- 
mids to firms near their apexes, or from firms they control via supervoting 
shares to firms in which they actually own a majority of the stock. Such 
transfer pricing can be accomplished via payments for intermediate goods, 
the private placement of  one firm’s securities with another, royalty pay- 
ments for patent or brand-name use, captive insurance subsidiaries, or any 
number of other channels. 
In some cases, the family patriarch may use corporate resources to ad- 
vance a particular political or social view. For example, when the Wallen- 
berg family’s top professional manager, Percy Barnevik, told a New York 
Times reporter, “If we  can’t get value, we  will  sell out,” indicating that 
weak Wallenberg firms might be sold, a surprised Peter Wallenberg clari- 
fied, “We would go to very great lengths to resuscitate a company, What- 
ever he might have said is  still a matter  of interpretation.” In the same 
article, Anders Scharp, vice-chairman of the Wallenberg flagship, Inves- 
tor’s AP, quipped, “It’s family values versus shareholder values” (Latour 
and Steinmetz 1998). Although Peter Wallenberg’s views may reflect popu- 
lar opinion in Sweden, this need not always be so. If the family patriarch 
uses corporate resources he controls, but does not fully own, to pursue an 
agenda with which shareholders do not agree, a misallocation of resources 
can result. The family patriarch does not bear the full economic costs of 
his agenda, but the shareholders and the society at large do. 
The potential for such prima facie misallocation is a central concern of 
5. For more formal and complete models of corporate pyramids, see Bebchuk and Zingales 
(chap. 2 in this volume), Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (chap. 10 in this volume), and 
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corporate-governance  law  outside  the  United  States  (see  Daniels  and 
Morck 1995). For example, Canadian corporate-governance law contains 
strict regulations about the disclosure of “related-party transactions” and 
about minority shareholders’ rights. Officers and directors are expected to 
treat all shareholders equally, rather than simply safeguard the sharehold- 
ers’ presumably identical interests in value maximization, as in the United 
States. However, a recent study of Canadian corporate governance con- 
cluded that  these protective  measures  are inadequate (see Daniels and 
Morck 1995).6 
11.3.3  Entrenched Family Control 
Most students of psychology agree that intelligence is, at best, only par- 
tially hereditary. Since entrepreneurial ability is presumably one dimen- 
sion of intelligence, successive generations of heirs to a business entrepre- 
neur’s fortune should, on average, exhibit abilities that regress steadily 
toward the population mean. Entrenched family control, therefore, leads 
to an increased probability of mediocre management with each successive 
generation unless the family either delegates decision making to profes- 
sional managers or is genetically very lucky. 
Consistent with the argument that  they value control, many wealthy 
families have difficulty accepting professional managers. In 1995, Stanley 
Heath resigned after only one year as CEO of Bata Inc., a multinational 
shoe store chain. The Czech-Canadian Bata family had hired him to usher 
in  fundamental changes and then, according to the  Toronto  Globe and 
Mail, decided that they did not like the changes after all (Heinzl 1995). 
According to the New York Times, Swedish billionaire Marcus Wallenberg 
repeatedly denounced his son Peter as having “neither the intelligence nor 
the vision to head the family businesses” (Strom 1996, 12F). In 1982, near 
the end of his life, Marcus tried to position Volvo chairman Gyllenham- 
mer, a professional manager, to take his place. Peter quietly bought shares 
in the relatively widely held Volvo until he had enough leverage over Gyl- 
lenhammer to force him out of  the Wallenberg companies. Peter is now 
the undisputed patriarch of the Wallenberg business group, which remains 
a strong and important part of the Swedish economy. 
This unwillingness to cede power to professional managers means that 
the question of succession can also adversely affect corporate governance. 
Prolonged  internecine  power  struggles  can  paralyze  family  corporate 
6. In a country where a few large shareholders control most corporations through pyra- 
mids, supervoting shares, or other means, there is little if  any opportunity for managers to 
ignore the large shareholders’ wishes. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) convincingly argue that 
large-shareholder  oversight in the United States should prevent managers  from pursuing 
their  self-interest at the shareholders’ expense. In many other economies, such a salutary 
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groups. For example, the Canadian McCain corporate group was maimed 
by  a festering dispute between the ruling brothers,  Wallace and Harri- 
son, over whose son should succeed them (McLaughlin 1995a). In Ecua- 
dor, deceased banana billionaire “Lucho” Naboa’s second wife, Mercedes, 
and his second son from his first marriage, Alvaro, fought an unseemly 
struggle for control  of his corporate  group. Apparently, someone even 
hired thugs to steal copies of the will hidden in New York.’ Meanwhile, 
the family’s firms drifted (De Cordoba 1995). Different families have at- 
tempted  to avoid such problems in  different ways. The Eaton family of 
Canada defused succession problems by  bringing increasing numbers of 
Eatons into managerial  positions  with each successive generation. The 
family’s flagship company is currently in bankruptcy. The Bronfman fam- 
ily has used a more Darwinian approach, letting contending heirs compete 
to be named  dauphin. Having no immediate successor can be  as big a 
problem as is too many possible successors. When patriarch Ted Rogers 
of Rogers Communications retired in 1994, his children Lisa, then twenty- 
seven,  and  Edward,  twenty-six, were  regarded  as heirs  apparent  who 
would take control after another ten years or so of training. Interim man- 
agers were unable to exercise leadership in this situation, and Ted Rogers 
returned despite triple bypass and eye surgery (McLaughlin 1995b). 
Many aging founders have difficulty even contemplating their retire- 
ment, let alone readying their corporate groups for professional managers 
or for the next generation of the family. Despite a public declaration of 
his intention to retire at sixty-five, Paul Desmarais, patriarch  of Power 
Corporation, the key company of one of Canada’s largest control pyra- 
mids, remains firmly in control. The Financial Post reports an anonymous 
possible successor as saying, “I don’t know how to get rid of dad’s old 
boys. They don’t understand  present  competitive life, customer service, 
and just-in-time delivery. They’re just sort of performing an activity, like 
having coffee every morning. But I can’t do anything about it because dad 
won’t let me fire them” (McLaughlin 1995a, 14-15). 
All these examples are qualitatively similar to entrenched management 
in U.S. firms with insider ownership above a certain threshold, as modeled 
by  Stulz (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989). That is,  the family-ap- 
pointed managers of firms in control pyramids are not vulnerable to re- 
moval by public shareholders through hostile takeovers, proxy contests, or 
other mechanisms as only a minority of the stock of any individual firm is 
in public hands. The difference is that the entrenchment of these family dy- 
nasties in other countries is hereditary and affects the dozens or hundreds 
of companies in family-controlled pyramids. 
7. Who hired the thugs is unclear, although the  Wall Srreet Journal (De Cordoba  1995) 
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11.3.4  Family Control and Firm Performance: 
The Worst of Both Worlds? 
In  the  United  States, many  studies have  found  that  divergence-of- 
interests problems, like those described in section 1 1.3.2, reduce share- 
holder value for very widely held firms while management-entrenchment 
problems, like those described in section 11.3.3, reduce shareholder value 
for relatively closely held firms (see, among many others, Stulz 1988; Mc- 
Connell and Servaes 1990; and Morck et al. 1988). We  have shown how 
pyramids can magnify  the  divergence of  interests between  controlling 
families and the public shareholders of pyramid companies. We have also 
argued  that  pyramids  entrench  hereditary  management,  regardless of 
competence, in more complete control over more corporate assets than is 
possible with the same family wealth in the United States.* Firms in pyra- 
mids are thus simultaneously potentially subject to the worst of both prob- 
lems in terms of public-shareholder value.9 
Of course, if  the family provides superior management in firms it con- 
trols, this may negate all the problems outlined above. Khanna and Palepu 
(1999, chap. 9 in this volume) argue that skilled corporate management is 
scarce in  India and that family corporate groups organized as pyramids 
are, on net, beneficial because they expand the scope to which the families' 
management skills are applied. This may  be true in many cases, includ- 
ing the Bronfman, Wallenberg, and other corporate groups mentioned 
above.'" Nonetheless, pyramids and the leverage that they introduce be- 
tween ownership and control unquestionably create latitude for immense 
corporate-governance problems. 
To  investigate these issues, tables  11.4 and  11.5 compare the perfor- 
mance of Canadian firms according to the type of controlling shareholder 
they have. The categories of controlling shareholder that we consider are 
analogous to those covered in the previous section. Firms in pyramids 
are defined as having the same controlling shareholder as the firm at the 
pyramid's apex. We divide firms into the following categories: Firms with- 
8. Control pyramids are essentially unknown in the United States. We suspect that this is 
because the United States imposes double taxation  on virtually all dividends. In contrast, 
Canada and other countries with which we are familiar tax dividends paid to people, leaving 
most intercorporate dividends tax-free for the recipient firm. Clearly, pyramid control be- 
comes prohibitively expensive when intercorporate dividends are taxed. Public finance and 
tax  economists  seem not  to have appreciated  the  corporate-governance  implications  of 
dividend-taxation policies. 
9. Note that some discussions of managerial entrenchment assume that managers gain 
pure utility from control. This assumption is not necessary. If rent-seeking power is propor- 
tional to assets controlled rather than wealth and rent seeking allows those with control to 
pursue their self-interest, managers and large shareholders should value control as a means 
for increasing their consumption. 
10. Daniels, Morck, and Stangeland (1995) find that Bronfman pyramid firms performed 
no worse than other similar firms but appear to follow higher-risk strategies. Table 11.4  Relation of Controlling Shareholder’s Category to Performance of Large Canadian Firms, Based on 1984-89  Annual Reports Controlling 
for Firm Age and Size (industry benchmarks are 3digit US.  industry averages) 
Dependent Variable 
Controlling 
Shareholders’  Operating Income over Assets  Operating Income over Sales  Sales Growth  Employees Growth 
Categories 
Compared  1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median  1984-89  Mean  1984-89 Median  1984-89 Mean  198489  Median  1984-89  Mean  1984-89 Median 
Heir minus business  -.0113  -.0156  -.0131  -.0188  -.0299  -.0274  -.OM  -.03M  -.115  -.0794  -.0661  -.M30  -285  -.0526  -265  -219 
entrepreneur  (.56)  (.32)  (S2)  (.26)  (.OX)  (.I31  (.05)  (.07)  (.lo)  (.12)  (.IS)  (S4)  (.06)  (.85)  (.08)  (.05) 
Heir minus widely held  -.00915  -.0192  -.OM98  -.0150  -.OM7  -.0443  -.05820  -3426  -.W%  -.0938  -.0663  -.0685  -.0112  ,221  .M78  .0622 
1521  (701  1521  ~701  1521  1701  ~521  ~701  ~521  1701  1521  1701  1521  POI  1521  1701 
(~6)  (.lo)  (.76)  (.oil  (.02)  (.ni)  (.02)  (.II)  (.ox)  (.09)  (.lo)  (.88)  ~22)  ~43)  (.17) 
1741  [loll  1741  [loll  1741  [I011  1741  [loll  [74]  [I011  [74]  [loll  (741  [IOI]  [74]  [loll 
Heir minus all other domestic  -.00918  -.OM1  -.00223  -.0180  -.Om -.Om -.0342  -.0274  -.0859  -.0666  -.0525  -.0330  -.I28  ,144  -.0334  -.0125 
private-sector firms  (S3)  (.05)  (35)  (.08)  (.05)  (.05)  (.06)  (.07)  (.29)  (.33)  (.13)  (.27)  (.38)  (.24)  (.56)  (30) 
Businessentrepreneur minus  -.00960  -.00934  -.OM54  -.Gill88  -.0332  -.OW  -.0317  -.0193  -.0101  -.M54  -.0378  -.0600  .184  .180  233  247 
widely held  (S5)  (.47)  (.78)  (39)  (.16)  (.20)  (.20)  (.41)  (.89)  (.57)  (A)  (.31)  (.I2)  (.09)  (.03)  (.01) 
1681  [831  1681  1831  WI  1831  (681  1831  [681  [831  [681  I831  1681  1831  1681  [831 
Businessentrepreneur minus  -.00611  -.00805  ,00271  .00161  -.00935  -.00040  - 00128  -.0112  -.0101  -.OIM  -.00813  -.00962  ,147  ,141  ,233  225 
all other domestic private-  (.71)  (.61)  (34)  (.90)  (54)  (.98)  (.95)  (S6)  (-91)  (.90)  (33)  (.80)  (.37)  (.36)  (.@I)  (.MI) 
Pyramids included  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
[2oo]  [ZOO]  [200]  [Zoo]  [2oo]  [Zoo]  [200]  [200]  [200]  [ZOO]  [200]  [200]  [Zoo]  [Zoo]  1200)  [200] 
sector firms  [Zoo]  [2oo]  [2W]  [ZOO]  [2oo]  [2oo]  [Zoo]  [200]  [200]  [200]  [2oo]  [2oo]  [200]  [2oo]  [ZOO]  [2W] 
Nore: The numbers shown are coefficients on dummy variables 8,  (one if  the firm is in subsample I, zero if  it is in subsample 2) in ordinary least squares regressions of the form p, -  7 = p,,  + p, log(sales,) + 
p,  log(age,) + p,S, estimated across the relevant two subsamples. Boldface type indicates significance  at the 10  percent level in a one-tailed I-test. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed I-test probability levels. 
Numbers in  brackets are sample sizes. Table 11.5  Performance Differences for Large Canadian Firms by Controlling Shareholder Category, Performance Data from 1984-89  Annual Reports 






Operating Income over Assets  Operating Income over Sales  Sales Growth  Employees Growth 
1984-89 Mean  1984-89 Median  1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median  1984-89  Mean  1984  89 Median  1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median 
Heir minus business 
entrepreneur 
Heir minus widely held 
Heir minus all other domestic 
private-sector firms 
Business entrepreneur minus 
widely held 
Business entrepreneur minus 
all other domestic private- 
sector firms 
Pyramids included 
Nore:  The numbers shown are coefficients on dummy variables 6,  (one if the firm is in subsample I, zero if it is in suhsample 2)  in Ordinary least squares regressions of the form p, -  j  = @,  + p, log(sales,) + 
p, log(age,) + p,S, estimated across the relevant two subsamples. Boldface type indicates significance at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed r-test.  Numbers in parentheses  are two-tailed 1-test probability levels. 
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out control blocks of 20  percent or more are called widely held. Firms 
controlled  by  descendants  of  their  founders are called  heir  controlled. 
Firms controlled by  their founders are called business entrepreneur con- 
trolled. In some comparisons, we use a category called all other domestic 
private sector. This group is different in each comparison and includes all 
private-sector firms in our full sample less the firms to which they are 
being compared. For example, in a comparison of  heir-controlled firms 
and all other private-sector firms, the latter include all the firms listed in 
table 1  1.3 above for which data are available except heir-controlled firms, 
government-owned firms, and foreign-owned firms. 
We use four alternative measures of firm performance: return on assets, 
return on sales, real growth in total sales, and growth in number of employees. 
Return on assets and return on sales are defined as income plus taxes plus 
interest  plus depreciation over total assets and total sales, respectively. 
Data for these variables are from the Report on Business database. In anal- 
yses like these, controlling for industry differences is important. Unfortu- 
nately, many large Canadian firms have no comparable rivals within Can- 
ada. We therefore use two methods to control for industry norms: table 
1  1.4 uses US. three-digit industry averages, constructed from Compustat 
data as proxies for Canadian industry benchmarks, while table 11.5 uses 
U.S. firms of approximately the same size and age as our Canadian firms 
and in the same three-digit industry.ll Canadian corporate groups with 
consolidated balance sheets are compared to diversified U.S. conglomer- 
ates. Because the US. and Canadian economies are broadly  similar in 
most dimensions except for ownership structure, such comparisons are 
legitimate. To smooth the performance indicators, we consider medians of 
each from 1984 through 1989. We define firm size as total 1988 sales and 
firm age as the number of years between the initial incorporation year and 
1988, as listed in the Financial Post surveys or in corporate histories. 
Table  11.4  shows  the  values  and  significance  levels  of  dominant- 
shareholder-type dummies Si in regressions of performance, p, relative to 
U.S. industry average benchmarks, p, and with controls for firm size and 
firm age. For example, in a test of heir-controlled firms versus self-made 
business-entrepreneur-controlled  firms, Sj is  one if  the dominant share- 
holder is an heir and zero if the dominant shareholder is an entrepreneur. 
The regression 
(4)  p - p  =  p,  +  p,  log(firm size) +  p, log(firm age) +  P, 6 
is then run across the two subsamples of firms, and the values of the co- 
efficient p,  are recorded in table 11.4 for each pair of subsamples. Table 
11.5 contains the values and significance levels of the same regression co- 
efficient, but the benchmark, p,  is the analogous performance measures 
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for a U.S. firm in the same three-digit industry and of the same size and 
age as the Canadian firm in question.I2 
We can summarize the pattern findings in tables 1  1.4 and 1  1.5 as fol- 
lows. Control by heirs is associated with lower returns on sales and assets 
and with growth that is less than or equal to that observed in other compa- 
rable firms.I3  In contrast, founder control is associated with earnings lower 
than those in widely held firms but higher than those in heir-controlled 
firms and with growth greater than or equal to that of widely held firms 
and that of other firms in general. The pattern of signs and significance 
levels is similar regardless of whether we include firms in control pyramids 
or consider only firms directly owned by  the shareholders in  question. 
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that widespread corporate 
control by  heirs is, at least partly, responsible for the reduced economic 
growth of countries with large wealthholdings by heirs shown in table 11.2. 
It does  not,  however,  substantiate  our concern  that  control  pyramids 
might worsen the damage. 
11.4  Inherited Wealth and Capital Market Power 
In some countries, control pyramids and other mechanisms give billion- 
aire families control over substantial fractions of their country’s capital 
assets. This could conceivably translate into monopoly and monopsony 
market power in their domestic capital markets. 
1  1.4.1 
An efficient microeconomic allocation of capital requires that the risk- 
adjusted cost of capital be the same for all firms. The legal, regulatory, 
and institutional structures of many countries arguably channel capital to 
certain firms and limit other firms’ access to capital. 
First, many countries’ stock market regulations are such that entrepre- 
neurs find equity initial public offerings (IPOs) unattractive sources of 
capital (La Porta et al. 1997). Private equity financing in the form of ven- 
Limited Sources of Capital for Entrepreneurs 
12. We continue to include age and size controls in table 11.5 because the relation between 
relative performance and ownership may be different for firms of different sizes and ages. In 
fact, the logarithm of firm age retains its significance in many of the regressions in table 11.5. 
13. We need to be careful about our inference that heir-controlled firms have lower average 
returns on assets. Research-and-development (R&D) spending is a minus item in the calcula- 
tion of after-tax operating income since it  is part of general, sales, and administrative ex- 
penses, but it does not enter into the calculation of total assets since it is  expensed rather 
than depreciated. A precise adjustment is difficult since the disclosure of R&D is optional 
under Canadian generally accepted accounting policy. However, only the numerator of the 
return-on-sales figures should be affected by  this problem. As a rough check of  whether 
R&D is biasing our results, we  first estimated the relation of reported R&D to heir owner- 
ship. R&D is  negatively correlated  with heir ownership. If actual  R&D mirrors reported 
numbers, this effect strengthens, rather than weakens, our return on sales-and-assets find- 
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ture capital is primarily a U.S. phenomenon. Although other countries are 
attempting to foster venture capital financing, their scale remains limited 
(see “Adventures with Capital” 1997; “Finance and Economics” 1998). In 
Canada, the federal government has been providing generous tax incen- 
tives to create a venture capital industry controlled by  labor ~nions.’~  In 
both Europe and Canada, government-run  funds play large roles in the 
venture capital business, but these initiatives tend to confuse venture capi- 
tal financing with subsidies to depressed regional economies (see Murray 
1998; and Best and Mitra 1997). 
Second, entrepreneurs’ access to debt financing is often limited. Public- 
debt issues are unavailable to small, start-up firms. The  junk bond industry 
in the United States changed this, starting in the 1980s, but it has yet to 
spread  outside that country in  any  significant way  (see Hagger  1997). 
Banks in most countries prefer to lend to large, established borrows. Al- 
though the large Canadian banks have recently begun to boast of their 
lending to small businesses, they still require substantial collateralizable 
assets-a  rarity among entrepreneurial firms whose main asset is usually 
the intangible ideas of the entrepreneur (MacIntosh 1994). If billionaire 
families either control banks outright or influence them through political 
rent seeking more effectively than can entrepreneurs or the representatives 
of widely held firms’ shareholders, a redirection of capital might occur.1s 
Third, government industrial policies in many countries direct capital 
toward large, established businesses. Plausibly, these firms are more able 
to lobby for subsidies. Their stability is also more likely to be the object of 
lobbying by organized labor. For example, Beason and Weinstein (1 996) 
document that the (in)famous Japanese postwar industrial policy, by and 
large, subsidized unprofitable established industries. Also, until very re- 
cently, the Korean government had an explicit policy of orchestrating gen- 
erous low-cost bank loans to large family-controlled chaebol corporate 
groups. The result was an average debt-to-equity ratio of 4.0 in 1996 and 
relentless capital expenditure growth by these firms. The same year, chaebol 
firms averaged a 1 percent return on equity.16 A key part of the IMF’s on- 
going criticism of Asian “crony capitalism” is that established firms have 
too ready access to capital while new entrants cannot raise money locally. 
Finally, firms in many countries have been prevented from obtaining 
foreign capital by restrictions on inward investment flows. Explicit policies 
to deter both foreign direct investment (FDI) and inward foreign portfolio 
investment were especially common in emerging markets (Kim and Singal 
14. Management-expense ratios in these funds can reach  10 percent per year, and their 
15. In sec. 11.6 below, we argue that such a differential investment in rent seeking might 
16. For a detailed financial analysis of Korean public firms in the 1990s, see Kim, Kim, 
voting structures lock in union control (see Austin 1996). 
well exist. 
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1993). Interestingly, many of the countries in our sample with the highest 
heir-controlled wealth had explicit share classes or industry sectors that 
were unavailable to foreigners, ceilings on foreign shareholding, or manda- 
tory long holding periods for foreign investors, at least until quite recently. 
These include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Korea, Ma- 
laysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Except for closed-end funds, Taiwan’s 
stock market was closed until 1991, after which foreigners were allowed to 
invest up to a 10 percent ceiling. This was only raised to 15 percent in  1995. 
Even advanced countries have regulations hindering foreign portfolio in- 
vestment. For example, Japanese firms could not issue bonds to foreigners 
until quite recently. Even Canada, under Pierre Trudeau, made local firms’ 
access to FDI contingent on bureaucratic approval. 
These distortions might lead to more aggressive use of capital by family 
pyramid firms than by other firms. The absence of a well-developed ven- 
ture capital market impedes entrepreneurial firms but not established fam- 
ily firms. If billionaire families are better at lobbying for subsidies than en- 
trepreneurs or representatives of the shareholders of widely held firms, a 
differential access to capital might also ensue. Also, if  families are overly 
optimistic about their management abilities, the greater divergence of in- 
terests and entrenchment problems in pyramid firms (discussed in sec. 11.3 
above) might allow them to overexpand more aggressively than would be 
prudent for a widely held firm. If the initial complement of large firms are 
members of  family pyramids, barriers to capital inflow arguably lock in 
control by  those firms, preventing entrepreneurial firms and widely  held 
firms from rising to challenge them. 
1 1.4.2  Limited Investment Opportunities for Savers 
Economic efficiency also requires free competition for savers’ money. 
Again, the legal, regulatory, and institutional structures of many countries 
severely restrict savers’ portfolio choices, or did until very recently. 
Given the prevalence of  billionaire control, savers in  many countries 
have little choice but to hold the stocks of billionaire-controlled compa- 
nies in their portfolios. These problems afflict investors in most countries 
other than the United States and the United Kingdom. Even in Canada, 
only fifty-three of the top 500 firms are widely held (see table 11.3 above). 
Since these do not span all the industries in the Canadian economy, a di- 
versified portfolio of large widely held Canadian firms is not possible. 
The same lack of choice for savers applies to debt. Until recently, Japa- 
nese corporate bonds were unavailable to domestic investors in that coun- 
try because regulations forced firms to use bank  debt. Even now,  only 
bonds in highly profitable large firms are available. In Europe, legal access 
to foreign corporate bonds developed only recently, although the Euro- 
bond market may have provided informal access for wealthy savers. Bank 
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lished local firms, as banks in the main lend money to these firms or to 
governments.  Many  countries’  industrial  policies  are  also  essentially 
schemes to channel bank and postal savings to chosen firms. 
Finally, barriers against investing abroad have been ubiquitous through- 
out the world in recent decades and appear quite resilient to liberalization. 
To  “manage” their exchange rates, “insulate” their macroeconomies from 
external influences, and prevent the “sterilization” of their monetary poli- 
cies, many countries have instituted capital control measures that restrict 
domestic savers’ freedom to invest outside their home markets. Foreign 
portfolio investment by residents was banned in Argentina from 1983 to 
1990, until 1990 in Chile, and until 1994 in Greece. It remains tightly re- 
stricted in Korea (Kim and Singal 1993) and is illegal in Colombia and 
India. Other countries use regulatory hurdles or tax disincentives to dis- 
courage capital outflow. For example, Canada currently limits tax-free re- 
tirement savings accounts and pension funds to 20 percent foreign content. 
These restrictions on savers’ choices might allow large, existing firms to 
access capital at monopsony prices. Since family pyramid firms are all 
controlled by  the same party (the family), they are better able to realize 
such market power than are collections of independent widely held firms, 
even if the individual firms are otherwise similar. 
Of  course, restrictions  on savers’ portfolio choices and on entrepre- 
neurs’ financing options can, and often do, exist simultaneously. Thus, 
capital markets can be subject to both monopoly and monopsony distor- 
tions simultaneously, the favored parties being the established large firms, 
many of which are controlled by local billionaire families. 
11.4.3  Corporate Control and Capital Intensity 
To test for differential access to capital, we look again at large Canadian 
firms. Canada’s restrictions on the inflow and outflow of capital were rela- 
tively mild compared to those of many other countries. We are therefore 
using data from a country in which the likelihood of finding statistically 
significant results is relatively low. 
We cannot estimate firm-level costs of capital because of the intricate 
web  of  intercorporate  financial  agreements  typical  in  large  family- 
controlled  corporate groups. We  can, however, ask whether  large heir- 
controlled firms use labor less intensively relative to capital than do other 
comparable firms. If they do, this would be consistent  with these firms 
having preferential access to capital. Our sample is again the set of large 
Canadian firms described in table 11.3 above. 
We also examine labor-to-sales ratios, which is an indirect indicator of 
capital utilization.  If  a firm has a lower labor-to-sales ratio than other 
comparable firms, it is less labor intensive and is therefore plausibly more 
capital intensive than its peers. Of course, an extremely inefficient firm 
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than its peers, muddying inferences about labor-to-capital ratios. Despite 
this, and because accounting asset measures can be highly problematic, 
the labor-to-sales ratio may still be more informative, even though it is 
only indirectly related to the cost of capital. 
The dependent variables in our regressions are thus labor-to-capital ra- 
tios and labor-to-sales ratios. As in tables 1  1.4 and 11.5, we use two meth- 
ods of adjusting for industry, firm size, and firm age. First, we run regres- 
sions analogous to those in table 11.4, and, second, we use matched pairs 
analogous to the analysis in table 11.5. 
Table 11.6 shows that large Canadian firms controlled  by  heirs have 
significantly  lower  labor  intensity  than  entrepreneur-controlled  firms, 
widely held firms, and other firms in general. These differences are most 
consistently significant when we include pyramid firms. In contrast, entre- 
preneur-controlled firms have higher labor intensity than heir-controlled 
firms, widely held firms, and other firms in general. These findings are 
consistent with heir-controlled firms having access to lower-cost capital 
and with pyramid control structures facilitating this access.17  Recall that 
Canada’s capital  market  distortions  and  barriers  are relatively benign 
compared to those of many other countries. The fact that we  find signifi- 
cant results in that country raises the possibility of more severe capital 
misallocation elsewhere and suggests that relatively low barriers to capital 
flow can be potent. 
11.5  Inherited Wealth and Innovation 
Not surprisingly, established firms have been shown not to be support- 
ive of radical innovations (Betz 1993; see also Gompers and Lerner, chap. 
1 in this volume). Indeed, entrenched managers, including heirs, plausibly 
have a vested interest in blocking innovation (Acs et al. 1995). This should 
be particularly so for entrenched billionaires as their wealth is due to ex- 
isting capital, the value of which creative destruction destroys. We therefore 
conjecture that heir-controlled firms spend less on innovation than do other 
comparable firms. Moreover, in economies where heir control is extensive, 
economywide aggregate enterprise spending on R&D should be low. 
Table 11.7 contains regressions analogous to those in tables  1  I .4 and 
11.5 above but  explaining R&D spending. These regressions are more 
problematic than those in tables 1  1.4-1 1.6 for several reasons. First, R&D 
has skewed distributions, bounded below at zero. We  correct for this by 
using limited dependent variable regression techniques. Second, Canadian 
generally accepted accounting policy differs from U.S. accounting rules in 
17. It is also consistent with other interpretations, however. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Scharfstein (1990) argue that intercorporate transfers in Japanese corporate groups re- 
duce firm default risk and therefore reduce group firms’ costs of capital. Table 11.6  Coefficients on Dummies for Controlling Shareholder Category in Regressions of Labor-to-Capital  and Labor-to-Sales Ratios, 1984-89, 
Relative to Either US.  Industry Averages (panels A and B) or Industry-, Age-,  and Size-Matched U.S. Firms (panels C and D) 






A. Employees/Assets  B.  Employees/Sales  C. Employees/Assets  D. Employees/Sales 
Relative to U.S.  Industry  Relative to U.S. Industry  Relative to U.S. Matched Firms  Relative to U.S. Matched Firms 
1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median  1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median  1984-89 Mean  1984-89  Median  1984-89  Mean  1984-89  Median 
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-3.85  -11.3 
(.48)  (.l4) 
[331  1561 
-1.35  -11.3 
(.59)  (.14) 
1411  [561 
-2.13  -13.7 
(.78)  (.03) 
2.45  2.24 
(56)  (SI) 
4.58  4.16 
(.52)  (.53) 
11041  11041 
1441  1541 
11w  [I041 
No  Yes 
Note:  The numbers are coefficients on dummy variables 8, (one if  the firm is in  subsample  I, zero if it is in subsample 2) in  ordinary least squares regressions of  the form p, -  fi = p,  + p, log(sales,) +  e,  log(age,) + p,S, where the dependent variable is either employees  over assets or employees over sales and is adjusted for the US.  industry mean in panels A and B and for the analogous ratio of industry-, age-, and 
size-matched US. firms in panels C and D. Regressions are estimated across the relevant two subsamples. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed r-test probability levels. Numbers in brackets are sample sizes. 





R&D > 0 
Dummy” 
(1) 
Reported  Relative  Relative Reported 
R&D/Sales  Reported  R&D/Sales 
1984-89Mean  R&D Dummyb  1984-89  Mean‘ 




Heirs minus business 
entrepreneur 
Heirs minus widely held 
Heirs minus all other domestic 
private sector 
Business entrepreneur minus 
widely held 






































Nore: Table entries are coefficients on dummy variables 6, (one if the firm is in subsample 1, zero if it is in subsample 2). Regressions in cols. 1 and 2 are of 
the form y, -  p,  + p, log(salesJ + p,  log (age,) + &6,, while subsequent columns are of the form y, -  7,  = p,, + p, log (sales,) + p,  log (age,) + p$,,  where 
y, is the value of y for the matching U.S. firm. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed t-test probability levels, numbers in brackets are sample sizes. 
“Dummy is one for R&D > 0, zero otherwise. 
hDummy  is two if the Canadian firm reports R&D but its US. match does not, one if both either do or do not report R&D, and zero if the Canadian firm 
reports no R&D but its U.S. match does. 
‘Dependent variable is the Canadian firm’s R&D over sales minus that of its U.S. match. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  345 
that it lets companies freely choose whether to report their R&D. This 
makes R&D comparisons with U.S. firms difficult to interpret since Cana- 
dian firms may strategically report R&D spending. We  industry adjust our 
Canadian firms’ R&D spending by  subtracting the R&D spending of an 
industry-, size-, and age-matched U.S. control firm. These adjustments are 
problematic because of intrinsic data problems, so we  also report regres- 
sions with no industry adjustments. Unfortunately, adding industry dum- 
mies is not feasible given the sample sizes. 
Column 1 in table 11.7 is a logistic regression of a dummy variable (one 
if  the firm reports R&D and zero otherwise) on ownership type and our 
firm size and firm age controls. Column 2 displays coefficients from a To- 
bit regression of unadjusted R&D spending over sales on the same right- 
hand-side variables. We  scale R&D by  sales to avoid heteroskedasticity. 
Regressions 3 and 4 are analogous to regressions 1 and 2 but use matched 
U.S. firms to benchmark R&D spending. Regression 3 is an ordered logit 
where the dependent variable is two if  the Canadian firm reports R&D 
but the US. match does not, one if both either do or do not report R&D, 
and zero if the match reports R&D but the Canadian firm does not. Re- 
gression 4  uses R&D over sales for the Canadian firm minus R&D over 
sales for the U.S. match and so can be estimated using OLS. 
The results reported in  table 11.7 are broadly consistent with the hy- 
pothesis that heir-controlled firms invest less in innovation than compa- 
rable entrepreneur-controlled and widely held firms. In contrast, Cana- 
dian entrepreneur-controlled firms and widely held firms invest roughly 
comparable amounts in innovation. 
Our second conjecture is  that economies in which heir control is  ex- 
tensive tend to have less private-sector spending on innovation. To  test 
this, we correlate 1993 private-sector R&D spending, scaled by GDP, with 
billionaire-entrepreneur and billionaire-heir wealth, as in table 1  1.2 above, 
across countries. The first column of table 11.8 shows that enterprise R&D 
spending is negatively correlated with heir wealth (p-value = .13). Since 
richer countries plausibly have higher R&D spending, we  consider a mul- 
tiple regression of  private-enterprise R&D that controls for per capita 
GDP. Heir wealth draws a negative and highly significant coefficient. Sur- 
prisingly, we  also find  that  billionaire-entrepreneur wealth is  negatively 
correlated with private-enterprise R&D spending (p-value = .16) and that 
the corresponding regression coefficient is  negative and marginally sig- 
nificant (p-value = .lo). We are unable to explain this result. 
In summary, we  find that Canadian heir-controlled firms indeed appear 
less innovative than other firms. A cross-country regression also shows 
that countries with extensive heir wealth have less aggregate private-sector 
spending on innovation. These findings are consistent with our conjecture 
that heirs favor the status quo. Table 11.8  The Cross-country Relation between Barriers to Entry, Enterprise R&D Investment, and Capital Ownership Structure 
Innovation Spending and Barrier to Entry Measures 
Height of 
Enterprise R&D  Height of  Regulatory  Extent of  Height of  Height of 
Spending Scaled  FDI Barriers  Barriers  Government  Overall Tax  Trade Barriers 
by  GDP  Index  Index  Intervention  Burden Index  Index 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Simple correlation coefficients: 
Business entrepreneur wealth 
Inherited billionaire wealth over 




Log of per capital GDP, In( YIL) 
Business-entrepreneur billionaire 
Billionaire-heir wealth over 
R2 
wealth/GDP, Bl Y 







































Note: The maximal sample consists of the countries listed in table 11.1 above minus the United States and the United Kingdom. Numbers in parentheses 
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11.6  Inherited Wealth and Market Barriers 
We  have argued above that heir-controlled firms are relatively unprof- 
itable but that the heirs who control them are entrenched. Their strong 
economic position  is  due to their  heritage and their  controlled firms’ 
prominence as capital users and suppliers, not their abilities to manage or 
innovate. Given this, billionaire heirs are likely to see both innovation and 
openness as potential threats to the status quo, which favors them. We 
have shown above that heir control is associated with less innovation. In 
this section, we  explore whether billionaire-heir control is also related to 
explicit barriers to entry protecting product and capital markets. 
Control pyramids potentially create incentives for controlling families 
to invest  in  excess political lobbying. Pyramids let controlling families 
lobby using the resources of firms low in their pyramids, whose profitabil- 
ity is relatively unimportant to them. This means that the wealthy families 
can, in essence, use other people’s money to lobby for policies that pre- 
serve their positions. For example, for the owner of a privately held firm 
to justify spending $1.00 on lobbying, he (or his firm) must gain y 2 $1.00 
in benefits. In contrast, the controlling shareholder in a pyramid n levels 
high with control stakes of a  at each level need gain benefits worth only y 
2  a”  to him (or the apex firm) if  he uses $1.00 of the resources of a firm 
at the base of the pyramid for lobbying. In general, the controlling share- 
holder of a such a pyramid would continue spending his controlled firms’ 
resources on lobbying until his total private marginal rate of return equals 
I/A, where A = l/an  is the pyramidmultiplier defined in equation (3) above. 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that countries with weaker political struc- 
tures have less developed capital markets and speculate that this might be 
a deliberate policy to entrench the economic control of wealthy families 
and politicians. Anecdotal evidence consistent with wealthy families hav- 
ing considerable influence over national governments is also abundant. 
As  reported  in  the  Toronto Globe and  Mail, Revenue  Canada  allowed 
the Bronfman family to move $2 billion (Canadian) to the United States 
in 1991 without triggering capital gains taxes. When the auditor general 
reported that this “may have circumvented the intent of the tax code,” 
he was attacked by  the government finance committee for violating the 
Bronfmans’ right to privacy (see “Auditor Was  Wrong”  1996). Samuel 
Gordon, the former chairman of Del Monte Fruit, is reported to have said 
of the late Ecuadorian billionaire Luis “Lucho” Naboa, “If Lucho wanted 
a law passed, it passed. He could do things in Ecuador that I, as a mul- 
tinational, couldn’t’’ (see De Cordoba 1995). Most famously, Alfred Krupp 
(1812-87),  heir to the Krupp steel and armaments businesses founded in 
181 1 by his father, Friedrich Krupp, is said to have quipped: “As pants the 
deer for cooling streams, so do I for regulation.” 
We can use our cross-country data to explain barriers to entry in local 348  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
capital markets, both against foreigners obtaining local savings for invest- 
ment abroad and against locals wanting to use foreign capital. Table 11.8 
investigates whether countries in which inherited  family wealth is  large 
relative to GDP show evidence of such barriers, as measured by  a set of 
country-level institutional structure variables. 
Following Feldstein (1995), we use an index of the height of FDI barriers 
to measure the maintenance of capital market segmentation. We also con- 
sider the height of regulatory barriers, the extent of government intervention, 
and the overall tax burden index in each economy as general measures of 
impediments to market entry and capital flow. These variables are ob- 
tained from Holmes, Johnson, and Kirkpatrick (1997). They all take high 
values when the country in question is relatively difficult to enter and low 
values when entry is easy. Capital tends to avoid and flee heavy regulation, 
widespread government intervention, and high taxes, and the same poli- 
cies reduce investment inflows. Barriers against capital outflows therefore 
often accompany such policies. We also include a measure of  the height 
of trade barriers as a proxy for the general openness of the economy, as 
barriers to capital flow often accompany high trade barriers. 
We first estimate simple correlation coefficients of these measures with 
our country-level ownership structure variables and then run regressions 
controlling for per capita GDP. We  include the regressions because the 
country's openness to the world economy may depend on the level of its 
economic development, but we  also include the simple correlations be- 
cause economic growth, and therefore the level of economic development, 
may be endogenous. 
Columns 2-6  of  table 11.8 show that billionaire-heir wealth is greater 
when barriers to FDI are higher, consistent with these economies being 
subject to barriers to capital inflow. Our other barrier variables are uncor- 
related with billionaire-heir wealth, except for tax burden, which has a neg- 
ative sign. 
In contrast, billionaire-entrepreneur wealth is strongly negatively corre- 
lated with FDI barrier  height, regulatory  barrier height,  and extent of 
government intervention in the economy. Thus, billionaire-entrepreneur 
wealth is high when barriers to capital flow are low, and neither monop- 
sony nor monopoly pricing in capital markets is likely. 
Note that the height of general trade barriers in product markets is un- 
correlated with billionaire-heir and billionaire-entrepreneur  wealth. This 
is consistent with barriers around capital markets being more important 
than general, overall openness in this context. 
In summary, heir control appears to be associated with higher invest- 
ment-flow barriers but not necessarily with more government regulations, 
greater tax burdens, or trade barriers. In contrast, such barriers are lower 
in economies with more entrepreneur billionaire wealth. 
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11.7  Diagnosing a Canadian Disease? 
Our query is about why economic growth is negatively related to a coun- 
try’s stock of inherited billionaire wealth and positively related to its self- 
made billionaire wealth. We propose four underlying explanatory factors. 
First, billionaire heirs are often entrenched, poor managers and have per- 
verse incentives to engage in costly wealth shifting between firms they con- 
trol. Poor  governance causes heir-controlled  firms to do poorly  in the 
aggregate. Second, extensive old wealth distorts capital markets to favor 
these entrenched  heir-controlled firms. Third, billionaire-heir-controlled 
firms spend less on innovation. Fourth, they also lobby to erect entry bar- 
riers. 
Our four proposed explanations include both direct and indirect effects. 
The direct explanation is that billionaire heirs are entrenched, poor man- 
agers with perverse incentives. The indirect explanations are that billion- 
aire-heir wealth distorts capital markets, lowers R&D, and creates pres- 
sure for entry barriers and that these distortions, in turn, lower economic 
growth. We have country-level variables that capture the latter two indirect 
channels-our  enterprise R&D spending and entry-barrier variables from 
table 1  1  .%-and  we find cross-country evidence consistent with these chan- 
nels.I8  If they are the primary channels operating, adding variables that 
directly capture these effects to the regressions of table 1  1.2 above should 
eliminate the heir- and entrepreneur-wealth variables. In contrast, if either 
the direct effect or the capital market distortion channel predominates, 
adding these same variables should not affect the coefficients or signifi- 
cance of the wealth-structure variables. 
Table 1  1.9 displays regressions of the form 
where Y is GDP, L is population, Z is capital investment, and E is average 
years  of  education.  The vector  P contains  entry-barrier variables and 
spending on innovation. Different specifications in table 1 1.9 use different 
subsets of the elements of P. As before, the vector C contains our country- 
level capital ownership structure variables. 
18. It is unclear how we may directly proxy for capital market distortions. Broadly, less 
distortion might lead to larger markets. But market capitalization  also reflects economic 
development, which in turn affects growth. Moreover, market capitalization per se does not 
adequately capture the counterfactual benchmark required, i.e., what market capitalization 
would be if capital market distortions were absent. This benchmark is difficult to obtain- 
first, because of the endogenous relation between economic development and market capital- 
ization and, second, because of  the incomplete theoretical  development of  this area. We 
therefore leave these issues to future research. 350  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
Table 11.9  The Cross-country Relation between Economic Growth and Capital 
Ownership Structure Controlling  for Current per Capita Income, 
Capital Investment Rate, Level of Education, Enterprise R&D 
Investment, and Various Measures of Barriers to Entry 
(3)  (4) 
Intercept 
Log of per capita GDP, In( YIL) 
Capital accumulation rate, IIK 
Average total years of  education, E 
Extensive business regulations 
Height of trade barriers 
Height of FDI barriers 
Enterprise R&D spending over 
GDP, R&D/ Y 
Overall tax burden 
Business-entrepreneur billionaire 
Billionaire-heir wealth over GDP, 
R2 
wealth over GDP, El Y 










































































Note: The sample consists of the countries listed in table 11.1 above minus the United States 
and the United Kingdom. When we include enterprise R&D spending (scaled by  GDP, 1993 
data from OECD’s  1996 Industrial Competitiveness Benchmarking Business Environments in 
the Global Economy), we lose five countries owing to missing data: Austria, Belgium, Taiwan, 
South Africa, and Singapore. 
Table 11.9 shows that extensive regulation, trade barriers, FDI burriers, 
and high taxes are all correlated with slower economic growth, but only 
regulations and FDI barriers are significant. If we substitute extent of gov- 
ernment intervention for extent of regulation, the results are similar, but 
the intervention variable is  uniformly less significant. Surprisingly, and 
(apparently) inconsistent with the endogenous-growth literature, spending 
on R&D does not have a significant relation with economic growth. 
Billionaire-business-entrepreneur  wealth  is  at best  marginally  signif- 
icant in  a one-tailed test  once the height  of barriers to capital flow  is 
included. This is consistent with billionaire entrepreneurs adding to eco- 
nomic growth by  lobbying government for economic openness. It is im- 
portant to note that we  cannot assign a direction of causality here: the Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  351 
openness of  an economy could be due to lobbying by  entrepreneurs, or 
openness to world capital markets could allow entrepreneurs to flourish 
and become billionaires. In either case, it appears that the association of 
entrepreneur wealth with economic growth is intimately connected to cap- 
ital market openness and economic freedom in general. 
In contrast, billionaire-heir wealth remains negatively correlated with 
economic growth after the barrier-to-entry variables listed are introduced. 
This is consistent with the linkage between heir wealth and slow economic 
growth operating through mechanisms other than barriers to entry and 
investment in innovation. It is evident from the results presented in table 
1  1.9 that our primary observation of a negative correlation between bil- 
lionaire-heir wealth and economic growth mainly reflects some combina- 
tion of a direct negative relation due to heir control and an indirect linkage 
through capital market distortions. This does not rule out other links, 
most significantly, lobbying for barriers to capital flow. 
Poorly performing, heir-controlled firms should be driven out of busi- 
ness in competitive economies. However, preferential access to capital and 
capital market entry barrier protection may provide heir-controlled firms 
with an offsetting advantage that allows them to survive. In short, wide- 
spread billionaire-heir control may lead to a locking in of the status quo 
and a permanently reduced rate of economic growth. 
Again, a causal interpretation cannot be unambiguously based on cross- 
sectional regression results. A reverse causality interpretation of our table 
1  1.2 and table 1 1.9 results is that high growth adds to entrepreneur wealth 
and diminishes heir wealth. If economic growth is typically lower in coun- 
tries with more entry barriers (Edwards  1998), our results in table  1 1.8 
follow. However, this interpretation begs the question, Why should high 
growth  augment  entrepreneur  wealth  but  lower  heir  wealth?  Growth 
through capital accumulation might enrich entrepreneurs, but why should 
it impoverish heirs? Growth through Schumpeterian creative destruction 
clearly does both, but this answer still leads to the question of why  this 
process operates more rapidly in some economies than in others, which is 
the focus of this study. 
We have argued that widespread inherited corporate control leads to a 
locking in of the status quo and a consequently reduced rate of economic 
growth. We rely heavily on Canadian firm-level data to support this argu- 
ment, so a natural question arises as to its generalization. Are we describ- 
ing a uniquely Canadian disease? Clearly, the negative cross-country rela- 
tion between billionaire-heir wealth and economic growth may or may not 
reflect the same conditions elsewhere. More micro-level studies of other 
countries would be useful. 352  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
11.8  Liberalization: The Control and Treatment 
of the Canadian Disease? 
We  have argued that entry barriers and preferential access to capital 
allow heir control to survive and thus preserve uncompetitive firms. This 
implies that a sudden and unexpected regime shift that removes many of 
these advantages will  affect heir-controlled firms more adversely than it 
will  other firms. Moreover, if  entrepreneurs have previously been held 
back  by  entry barriers and limited access to capital, entrepreneur-con- 
trolled firms should be affected more positively by  these changes than 
should other firms. Therefore, in this section, we  consider an event that 
suddenly and unexpectedly rendered Canada more open to foreign capital 
and less protected by  entry barriers,  the  1988 Canada-US. Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). We conduct an event study using daily stock-price data 
and a comparison  of  accounting and ownership data before and after 
the FTA. 
The FTA eliminated product market trade barriers over the ten years 
following ratification, according to a preset schedule. Chapter  16 of the 
FTA also provided for prospective national treatment of investors. This 
immediately barred future barriers to capital flow of any kind between the 
two countries, although certain discriminatory taxes and regulations were 
grandfathered. Chapter 16 unquestionably provoked the greatest outrage 
from the Canadian nationalist press. 
There are several ways in which the FTA could conceivably have af- 
fected the relative standing of heir-controlled firms. First, heightened prod- 
uct market competition could have reduced the value of poorly managed 
firms. Second, a greater inflow of U.S. capital to Canadian entrepreneurs 
could reduce heir-controlled firms’ market power over the supply capital. 
It could also create more competition for Canadian corporate assets that 
are not shielded from takeovers. Third, U.S. firms active in Canada might 
raise capital there, creating more competition for Canadian savings and 
eroding entrenched players’ market power on that side of the capital mar- 
ket as well. Any or all of these would level the playing field between heirs 
and others. 
The FTA is suitable for an event study because ratification was not ex- 
pected. Canada had reached the final stages of negotiation of free trade 
agreements with the United States several times over the previous century 
and had always balked at the last minute. To establish a mandate for free 
trade, the Conservative prime minister, Brian Mulroney, had called a snap 
general election. The protectionist Liberal candidate, John Turner, was far 
ahead in the polls. Indeed, the best that a few late pre-election polls were 
predicting for the Tories was a draw and a consequent hung parliament or 
minority government. Neither boded well for the FTA, which required a Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  353 
Table 11.10  Sequence of Events Leading up to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Ratification by the Canadian Parliament 
Event DatdFirst 
Trading Date  Event 
Effect on 
Entrenched Firms 
4 Nov. 86/14 Apr. 86 
23 Apr. 86/24 Apr. 86 
23 Sep. 87/24 Sep. 87 
30 Sep. 87/1 Oct. 87 
2 Oct. 87/2 Oct. 87 
3 Oct. 8715 Oct. 87 
26 Oct. 88/26 Oct. 88 
28 Oct. 88/28 Oct. 88 
7 Nov. 88/7 Nov. 88 
10 Nov. 88/10 Nov. 88 
14 Nov. 88/14 Nov. 88 
19 Nov. 88/21 Nov. 88 
General background. Canada has negotiated free 
trade with the United States several times over the 
past century but never ratified the result 
Senate Finance Committee threatened to deny 
fast-track consideration of the FTA 
Approval of  fast-track procedure. The Senate Finance 
Committee vote was tied; negotiations could 
begin 
Threat to deny fast-track authorization. The U.S. 
Negotiations were discontinued 
Negotiations might restart. Discussions of the 
possibility of resuming negotiations announced at 
midnight, 30 September 
Negotiations resume 
Agreement reached. A trade accord was reached; for 
the first time, the media treats the possibility of 
free trade with the United States as a serious 
possibility 
Turner does well in televised pre-election debate. 
Liberal opposition leader John Turner vows on 
national television to dismantle the FTA 
Turner declared clear winner of  televised debate. 
Globe-Environomics  poll result released 
Liberal Party 10% ahead. Gallup Poll results 
Tories and Liberals tied. Globe-Environomics  poll; a 
minority government or hung parliament might 
not be able to ratify the FTA 
Tories and Liberals tied. Gallup poll confirms the 10 
November Globe-Environomics  poll result 
Surprise Tory majority government. Prime Minister 















majority vote for ratification, as the third party in Parliament, the socialist 
New Democrats, was even more protectionist than the Liberals. Nonethe- 
less, to the surprise of virtually everyone, a Conservative majority govern- 
ment was returned with a clear mandate to implement the Free Trade 
Agreement.19  Table 11.10 lists the major events leading up to the Conser- 
vative election victory. 
19. The increasing liberalization of the global economy should provide other opportunities 
for similar tests using data from other countries. 354  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
11.8.1 
We  first examine the stock-price reactions of firms classified accord- 
ing to types of dominant shareholders, as listed in table  11.3 above. We 
use the period from 10 through 21 November as our event window. The 
election was held on Saturday, 19 November, so 21 November is the first 
trading day following the Tory victory. On 10  November, the first polls 
showing a tie with the Liberals were published, and subsequent polls on 
14 November confirmed a tie. These dates thus include the period from 
the first hint that the Liberals might not win  through to the news of a 
Tory majority government. 
Our methodology in this section is thus to construct cumulative abnor- 
mal returns (CAR) using daily firm-level stock returns Y, as 
Stock-Price Reactions to the FTA 
where Y,! is the relevant Canadian industry index, constructed using three- 
digit SIC codes. We control for industry average stock-price movements, 
rather than market movements, because Thompson  (1994, table 2,  13) 
finds evidence that industry indexes move on these dates in ways plausibly 
related to Canada's comparative advantage relative to the United States.2o 
We also control for firm age and size. Thus, our regression is as follows: 
(7)  CAR,  =  Po +  P,log(age,) +  P,log(sales,) +  P,Sl, 
where the dummy variable Si  is one or zero according to the type of con- 
trolling shareholder, if any, the firm has. 
Table 11.11 shows parameter  estimates  and significance levels for tit 
when various subsets of dominant owners are compared with each other 
and with widely held firms. 
Heir-controlled companies appear most adversely affected, while firms 
controlled  by  business entrepreneurs appear to gain the most from the 
unexpected liberali~ation.~'  Intriguingly, the stock prices of heir-controlled 
20. Industry benchmarking in a small open economy is problematic as many large Cana- 
dian firms have no similarly sized Canadian rivals. Clearly, in this instance, benchmarking 
with U.S. industry returns makes no sense, so we use Canadian industry averages. We recog- 
nize that our industry benchmarks are consequently noisy. 
21. Khanna and Palepu (chap. 9 in this volume) find that economic liberalization in India 
is associated with a strengthening of family pyramid companies relative to other firms. Inter- 
estingly, greater capital market competition is  not a part of  India's current liberalization 
strategy. Note, however, that, when we drop Canadian pyramid member firms from our com- 
parisons, as in the first and third columns of table 1 I.  11, the significant point estimates move 
away from zero. Among freestanding firms only, entrepreneur-controlled  firms' prices rise 
more relative to heir-controlled and other firms. This is consistent with intragroup transfers 
mitigating the positive and negative expected effects of liberalization on group firms. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  355 
Table 11.11  Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Large Canadian Firms on the News That the 
Canada-US. Free Trade Agreement Would Be Ratified by the Canadian 
Parliament 
Mean Residual Differences 
Controlling for 
Firm Age & Size’  Mean Differences 
Controlling Shareholders’ 
Categories Compared  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Heirs minus business entrepreneurs 
Heirs minus widely held 
Heirs minus all other private-sector 
firms 
Business entrepreneurs minus 
widely held 
Business entrepreneurs minus all 
other private-sector firms 
Includes firms in pyramids 
Note:  Categories are defined as in table 11.3 above. Subsamples are smaller because we  do not have 
stock returns for all firms listed in that table. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels from 1- 
tests. Numbers in brackets are sample sizes. Boldface type indicates significance in a one-tailed t-test 
at the 10 percent level. The cumulative abnormal return is for all trading days from 10 November, the 
date of the first poll questioning the Liberal lead, through to 21 November 1988, the first trading day 
after a surprise Conservative majority  government was returned. Cumulative abnormal  returns are 
returns minus the value-weighted returns of all other firms in the three-digit industry. Using equal 
weighting gives similar results. 
aThis  panel contains coefficients andp-levels for 6, a dummy variable set to one if the firm is in subsample 
1 and zero if it is in subsample 2 in the ordinary least squares regression CAR, = Po + P, log (age,) + 
Pz log (sales,) + PA. 
firms and widely held firms move in statistically indistinguishable ways. In 
contrast, stocks of  business-entrepreneur-controlled firms rise relative to 
those of widely held firms. These findings are consistent with the hypothe- 
ses that heir-controlled firms are less able to meet increased product mar- 
ket competition and/or are less able to adapt to a more competitive capi- 
tal market. 
11.8.2  Changes in Capital Intensity 
As mentioned above, chapter 16 of the FTA requires national treatment 
of investors from the United States. This encourages U.S. enterprises both 
to invest in Canada and to raise capital there, raising the general level 
of competition in Canadian capital markets. Heir-controlled firms should 356  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
therefore lower their capital intensity as whatever capital market power 
they formerly enjoyed is eroded. 
We return to our statistical analyses of industry-adjusted labor-to-sales 
ratios in table 1  1.6 above, but now we consider the post-FTA period from 
1992 through  1996. Table  11.12 also shows the changes in  these ratios 
from the pre-FTA (1984-89)  period to this post-FTA period for various 
categories of firms surviving through  1996. Each entry in the first and 
third  panels  of  table  11.12 is a  regression coefficient of  an ownership 
dummy for controlling shareholder type in a regression of (U.S.-industry- 
adjusted) labor over sales on that dummy and controls for the logarithms 
of firm age and size.22  U.S. industry averages are the industry benchmark 
in panel A. U.S. firms the same size and age in the same industry serve in 
this capacity in panel C. In panels B and D, the dependent variables are 
the changes for each firm in the figures in panels A and C, respectively, 
from the 1980s. 
A clear pattern emerges. Table 1 1.6 above shows that, in the 1980s, heir- 
controlled  firms had  lower  labor  intensity  than did  entrepreneur-con- 
trolled firms. Table 11.12 shows that, for heir-controlled firms that sur- 
vived, these differences remain in the 199Os, although they have become 
less significant. Table 1  1.6 also shows entrepreneur-controlled  firms hav- 
ing insignificantly higher labor intensity than widely held firms, while heir- 
controlled firms’ labor intensity was significantly lower than that of widely 
held firms. After liberalization, this changes. Both heir-controlled and en- 
trepreneur-controlled firms that survived became significantly more labor 
intensive than widely held firms. The coefficients are also all significantly 
different from those in the 1980s. Panels B and D show that surviving heir- 
controlled  and entrepreneur-controlled firms both increased their labor 
intensity significantly more than widely held firms did. If our assumption 
that a low labor-to-sales ratio means high capital intensity is valid, widely 
held firms began using significantly more capital per worker after liberal- 
ization. This is consistent with widely held firms’ access to capital im- 
proving. 
11.8.3  Stronger Competition? 
The FTA increased product market and capital market competition in 
Canada. This should have been most detrimental to the least-competitive 
Canadian firms and most advantageous to the best Canadian firms. Tables 
11.13 and 11.14 repeat the analyses in tables  11.4 and  11.5 above and 
compare firm groups’ returns and growth for the period  1992-96  to see 
whether the gaps in performance between firms controlled  by  different 
types  of  shareholders have  widened. Heir-controlled  firms continue to 
22. Panel A of table  11.12 is  analogous to table  11.4 in  construction, while panel C is 
analogous to table 11.5. Table 11.12  Coefficients on Dummies for ControllingShareholder Category in Regressions  of Labor-to-Capital and Labor-to-Sales Ratios Controlling 
for Industry, Firm Size, and Firm Age (1992-96  in panels A and C; differences from 1984-89  and 1992-%  in panels B and D, panels A and 






B.  Change in Employees/Sales  D. Change in EmployeeslSales 
A. EmployeeslSales  Relative to US. Industry  C. EmployeesISales  Relative to US. Matched Firms 
~  Relative to U.S. lndustry  Relative to U.S. Matched Firms 
~ 
~  199-96 Minus  1992-96  Minus  ~  1992-96  Minus  1992-96  Minus 
1992-96Mean  1992-96Median  1984-89  Mean  1984-89Median  199-96Mean  1992-96Median  1984-89Mean  1984-89Median 
Heir minus business  -2.40  -1.92  -2.63  -2.11  2.38  0.161  1.45  0.520  -3.50  -0.846  -3.51  -0.829  0.657  ,540  1.41  .971 
entrepreneur  (22)  (.24)  (.19)  (.20)  (S2)  (.93)  (S7)  (.El)  (.16)  (.41)  (.17)  (.42)  (.72)  (.65)  (.44)  (.45) 
[361  [471  [361  [471  [361  [471  [361  [471  [I91  [29l  [I91  [29l  [19l  [29l  [I91  [29l 
Heir minus widely held  2.37  1.08  2.34  1.12  3.43  3.47  3.86  3.14  -0.37  -0.85  -0.35  -0.83  2.29  ,540  2.62  ,971 
(.15)  (.43)  (.17)  (.41)  (.lo)  (.06)  (.II)  (.07)  (.79)  (.41)  (30)  (.42)  (.05)  (.65)  (.06)  (.45) 
PI  [601  [431  [601  [431  [a1  [431  [a1  PI1  [29l  PI1  [29l  1211  I291  [211 
Heir minusallother domestic  0.0521  0.287  -0.079  ,202  1.98  1.67  2.49  2.02  -1.45  -1.47  -1.43  -1.47  1.91  ,276  2.38  ,703 
private-sector firms  (.96)  (.75)  (.94)  (32)  (.l4)  (.IS)  (-05)  (.07)  (27)  (.18)  (29)  (.19)  (23)  (34)  (.12)  (S9) 
Businessentrepreneur minus  4.66  3.31  4.82  3.46  3.41  3.76  3.13  2.69  2.42  1.62  2.46  1.63  0.765  ,863  0.312  ,738 
[I241  11241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [57]  [57]  [57]  [57]  (571  (571  [57]  [57] 
widely held  (.no)  (.os)  (.cq  (.04)  (.07)  (.lo)  (.II)  (.H)  (.23)  (.34)  (.z3)  (.35)  (.59)  (.47)  (.Ez)  (~4) 
[381  [451  [381  [451  [381  [451  [381  [451  [251  [291  [251  [291  [25l  [291  1251  [291 
Entrepreneurminus all other  1.85  1.85  1.95  1.95  1.20  1.20  0.756  0.756  2.03  2.03  2.03  2.03  0.714  ,714  0.571  .571 
domestic private-sector firms  (.I])  (.11)  (.09)  (.09)  (.43)  (.43)  (.60)  (50)  (.07)  (.07)  (.08)  (.08)  (.60)  (.60)  (.67)  (.67) 
[I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [I241  [57]  [57]  [57]  [57]  [57]  (571  [57]  [57] 
Pyramids included  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Nore: The numbers in panels A and C are coefficients on dummy variables 8, (one if the firm is in subsample  I, zero if  it is in subsample 2) in Ordinary least squares regressions of the form p, -  p  = p,,  + 
p, log(sales,) + p,  log(age,) + p,S, where the dependent variable is either employees over assets or employees over sales and is relative to the U.S. industry mean in panel A and to the analogous ratio for a U.S. 
firm the same size and age in the same industry in panel C. Numbers in  panels B and D are simple diflerences. Estimates are across the relevant two subsamples. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed 1-test 
probability levels. Numbers in brackets are sample sizes. Boldface type indicates significance at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed 1-test. Table 11.13  Relation of Controlling-Shareholder Category to Performance of Large Canadian Firms, 1992-96 Annual Reports, Controlling for Firm Age 
and Size (industry benchmarks are 3digit US.  industry averages) 
Dependent Variable 
Controlling 
Shareholders'  Operdting Income over Assets  Operating Income over Sales  Sales Growth  Employees Growth 
Categones 
Compared  1992-96 Mean  1992-96  Median  1992-96  Mean  1992-96  Median  1992-96  Mean  1992-96 Medidn  1992-96  Mean  1992-96 Median 
Heir minus business  -34423  ,00126  -.GO472  .00069  -.0134  -.0125  -.0111  -3086  ,00133  ,0309  ,0311  ,0461  ,0251  ,0261  ,0401  ,0375 
entrepreneur  (34)  (.95)  (33)  (-97)  (.47)  (.45)  (S9)  (.64)  (.98)  (.55)  (SO)  (.29)  (.75)  (.69)  (.61)  (58) 
[381  [@I  [381  1491  1381  1491  1381  1491  [361  1461  1361  1461  I331  1431  [331  1431 
Heir minus widely held  -.la  -.I15  -.182  -.I14  -.0674  -.0578  -.0668  -.0547  -.0554  -.0174  -.0698  -.0359  -.00751  -.0142  ,0146  -.00233 
(.19)  (.24)  (.19)  (.25)  (.I61  (.lo)  (.16)  (.11)  (.38)  (.72)  (.26)  (4)  (-92)  (.79)  (34)  (.96) 
[441  1601  [MI  [ml  1441  1601  [441  [601  1441  (581  1441  I581  I371  1511  [371  I511 
Heirminusallotherdomestic  -.0805  -.I00  -  0810  -.lo1  -.OM3  -.OW5  -3626  -.ME4  -.00892  ,00899  -.00579  ,00613  ,00255  ,00165  ,0191  ,0182 
private-sector firms  (.31)  (.15)  (.31)  (.14)  (.16)  (.M)  (.19)  (.06)  (33)  (30)  (38)  (.86)  (.95)  (.96)  (.62)  (.59) 
[I251  11251  [I251  [I251  11261  [I261  [I261  11261  [I181  [I181  (1181  [I181  [I051  [I051  [lo51  [IOS] 
Business entrepreneur minus  -.I87  -.I52  -.I85  -.I50  -.0473  -.0538  -.0494  -.0538  -.0364  -.0247  -.0620  -0542  ,00366  -.0181  ,0165  -.00755 
widely held  (.25)  (.28)  (25)  (.29)  (.38)  (27)  (.35)  (26)  (.63)  (.72)  (.41)  (.43)  (.95)  (.74)  (.70)  (36) 
(411  [A71  (411  [471  1411  [471  1411  [471  (391  1441  1391  1441  [331  (381  (331  (381 
Businessentrepreneur minus  -.OM5  -.0545  -.055  -.055  -.0311  -.0311  -.0323  -.0323  -.0129  -.0129  -.0378  -.0378  -.0182  -.a182  -.0117  -.0117 
all other domestic private-  (S3)  (-53)  (S3)  (.53)  (.54)  (.54)  (.54)  (.%)  (.78)  (.78)  (.40)  (.40)  (.69)  (.69)  (.79)  (.79) 
sector firms  [I251  (1251  11251  [I251  11261  11261  [I261  [I261  [I181  [I181  [I181  Ill81  [I051  [I051  [I051  [I051 
Fyramids included  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Note:  The numbers shown are coefficients on dummy variables 6,  (one if the firm is in subsample I, zero if  it is in  subsample 2) in ordinary least squares regressions of the form p, -  7 = p,,  + p, log(sales,) + 
p, log(age,) + p,S, estimated across the relevant two subsamples. Boldface type indicates significance at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed 1-test. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed 1-test probability levels. 
Numbers in brackets are sample sizes. Table 11.14  Relation of ControllingShareholder Category to Performance of Large Canadian Fims, lWZ%  Annual Reports, Controlling for Firm Age 






Operating Income over Assets  Operating Income over Sales  Sales Growth  Employees Growth 
1992-96Mean  1992-96Median  1992-96Mean  1992-96Median  1992-96Mean  1992-96Median  1992-96Mean  1992-96Median 
Heir minus business 
entrepreneur 
Heir minus widely held 
Heir minus all other domestic 
private-sector firms 
Business entrepreneur minus 
widely held 
Business entrepreneur minus 



































































Note:  The numbers shown are coefficients on dummy variables 8,  (one if  the firm is in subsample I, zero if it is in subsample 2) in ordinary least squares regressions of the formp, -  ji  = p,  + p, log(sales,) + 
p,log(age,)  + p,S,  estimated across the relevant two subsamples. Boldface type indicates significance at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed r-test. Numbers in parentheses are two-tailed t-test probability levels. 
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perform worse than widely held firms and other firms in general, and the 
point estimate differences have widened. But the differences between heir- 
controlled  and entrepreneur-controlled firms  have  narrowed,  although 
entrepreneur-controlled firms continue to grow faster. Entrepreneur-con- 
trolled firms’ earnings continue to be lower than those of widely held firms, 
and widely  held  firms’ growth  now  matches  that  of  entrepreneur-con- 
trolled firms. 
In short, widely held firms appear to have benefited disproportionately 
as Canada became more integrated with U.S. product markets and capi- 
tal markets. In contrast, heir-controlled firms continue to report slower 
growth and lower earnings than other firms, and they may  actually be 
falling further behind. 
11.8.4  The Staying Power of Concentrated Wealth 
The implementation  of the FTA also lets us look at transition  rates 
between different ownership structures as competition grows. To do this, 
we first compare the ownership structures of our sample of large Canadian 
firms in 1988, immediately prior to the FTA, to those in 1994, the last year 
for which we have complete data.23  This comparison is summarized in the 
transition matrix of table 11.15. 
The fraction of firms that are either widely held or owned by a widely 
held parent  increases from 27.24 percent (sixty-seven firms) in  1988 to 
32.11 percent (seventy-nine firms) in  1996. Four of the eight firms that 
ceased to be heir controlled became widely held. Also, most firms whose 
founders left the scene become widely held. Of the twenty-seven firms clas- 
sified as owned by business entrepreneurs, four became widely held, two 
ended up with a financial institution as a controlling shareholder, one went 
bankrupt, one was acquired by a foreign parent, and in only one firm was 
“control” passed on to an heir. In both cases, a x2 goodness-of-fit test 
soundly rejects the hypothesis of random changes in ownership structure 
(p-level < 5 percent).24  The proportion of widely held firms also rose be- 
cause four of the five privatized state-owned enterprises in our sample of 
very large firms became widely held.25 
23. Our 1994 ownership data are from the same sources as our 1988 data. 
24. In the x2 tests, we  treat categories  i (cooperatives) and j  (labor controlled)  as one 
category. We also collapse c (no controlling shareholder) andf(widely held Canadian parent) 
into a single category. Because heir-controlled  firms cannot become  “entrepreneur-con- 
trolled” firms, the number  of categories into which  heir-controlled firms can pass is  one 
minus the number open to entrepreneur-controlled  firms. The X2-statistic is calculated as the 
sum of squares of observed minus expected transitions over the number of expected transi- 
tions. The Xz-statistic  is calculated as the sum of squares of observed minus expected transi- 
tions over the number of expected transitions. The x2(6)-statistic for the hypothesis that the 
transformations of heir-controlled firms follow a random pattern is 27.42, with a probability 
value less than 0.5 percent. The x2(7)-statistics for changes of entrepreneur-controlled  firms 
is 17.99, with a probability value less than 2.5 percent. 
25. We  obtain qualitatively identical  results when  we  include firms without accounting 
data in the transition matrix reported in table 11.15. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  361 
Table 11.15  Transition Matrix for Large Canadian Firms Relating Controlling-Shareholder 
Description in 1988 to Controlling-Shareholder Description in 1994 
___  ~ 
1988 Controlling-Shareholder Type  Changes 
1994 Controlling-  into 1994 
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Source: Sample is firms in the 1988 Financial Post  500 for which accounting and ownership data are 
available. 
Nore: Definitions are as follows: 
a = heir 
b = business entrepreneur 
c = no controlling shareholder (widely held) 
d = other individual or family 
e = investment fund 
f = widely held Canadian parent firm 
g = foreign parent firm 
h = government 
i = co-op 
j = labor 
11.8.5  A Cure? 
We  contend that  the negative relation between heir control and eco- 
nomic growth is  due  to heirs often  being  entrenched,  poor  managers 
whose firms nonetheless survive because of their preferential access to 
capital  and  protection  from  competition.  The  liberalization stemming 
from the  Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement arguably increased both 
product and capital market competition in Canada. Heir-controlled firms’ 
inability to compete in this harsher environment is exposed in their nega- 
tive stock-price reactions to the FTA. The value discount that outsiders 
attached  to heir  control  rose. At  the  same time,  heir-controlled firms 
capital-to-labor ratios converged to those of other firms, suggesting less 
preferential access to capital. Finally, in the years following the FTA, the 
firms of departing entrepreneurs tend to become widely held rather than 
heir controlled, again consistent with a large value discount connected 
with heir control. We suggest, therefore, that liberalization in international 
trade and capital flow  may  alleviate the Canadian disease by  rendering 
product  and capital markets more competitive and thereby raising the 362  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
price that families must pay to maintain inherited corporate control. These 
findings can be  interpreted as providing empirical support for the ideas 
set forth in Olson (1982) that trade liberalization has important beneficial 
effects related to dislodging entrenched special interest groups. 
11.9  Conclusions 
The central result of this paper is that the ownership structure of a coun- 
try’s capital matters. Economic growth depends, not just on the stock of 
physical capital, but also on who controls it. We find that entrenched fam- 
ily control of a nation’s capital is correlated with lower rates of economic 
growth while billionaire entrepreneurs’ control of capital is correlated with 
higher rates of economic growth. 
We consider several explanations for this finding. First, old wealth may 
entrench poor management, and control pyramids may  distort their in- 
centives. Second, a sharply skewed wealth distribution may create market 
power in capital markets, causing inefficiency. Third, entrenched billion- 
aires have a vested interest in preserving the value of old capital and thus 
in slowing creative destruction. Fourth, old money becomes entrenched 
through control of the political system and, most especially, by  erecting 
barriers to capital mobility. In contrast, substantial self-made billionaires’ 
wealth is observed where such forces are edentulous and creative destruc- 
tion occurs. 
Using micro-level data from Canada, we  find evidence consistent with 
the first three explanations. Switching to cross-country data, we find sup- 
portive evidence for the third and fourth explanations. In an expanded 
regression analysis of cross-country differences in growth, we confirm that 
the  positive relation  between  entrepreneur-controlled  capital  and  eco- 
nomic growth is  connected with lower entry barriers  and  openness. In 
contrast, the linkage between heir-controlled capital and lower economic 
growth is due, not just to higher inward foreign investment barriers, but 
also to entrenched  heir  control  and capital  market  distortions  arising 
from this. 
We dub depressed growth associated with widespread corporate control 
by wealthy heirs the Canadian diseuse. It is characterized by  one or more 
of the following symptoms: poor overall management quality, capital mar- 
kets and institutions that channel money to large, established family firms, 
a dearth of innovation that locks in the status quo, and political rent seek- 
ing that deters entry. The term  Cunudiun diseuse is  appropriate because 
our empirical evidence relies heavily on Canadian data. We  suspect that 
this malady is widespread globally and that it is especially deleterious in 
many developing economies. More work is clearly needed before this sup- 
position can be confirmed. 
We  show that freer international trade and capital flow appear to level 
the  playing  field  between  heir-controlled, entrepreneur-controlled, and Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  363 
widely held Canadian firms. If our conjecture that entrenched family con- 
trol is detrimental to an economy is correct, trade and capital flow liberal- 
ization may have important beneficial economic effects that are not cap- 
tured by standard models of international trade and international finance. 
Data Appendix 
International Data 
Our country-level sample begins with all countries having  1997 GDP 
greater  than U.S.$l  billion.  We  drop postsocialist  economies,  such as 
China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia; economies sub- 
ject to economic sanctions, such as Cuba, Iran, and Iraq; the oil sheik- 
doms Bahrein and Brunei; the tax havens Liechtenstein and Luxembourg; 
Ethiopia, Kuwait,  and Lebanon, which are undergoing postwar  recon- 
struction; Sri Lanka and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which 
are currently experiencing civil war; and Bangladesh, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tan- 
zania, and the United Arab Emirates because of  missing data. The final 
sample consists of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portu- 
gal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thai- 
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. We 
exclude the United States and the United Kingdom from our sample on 
the grounds that their corporate ownership structures are highly atypical, 
in  that their  large listed companies are predominantly  directly held by 
small shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). 
Data on billionaire wealth is from Forbes magazine’s annual list of bil- 
lionaires for 1993. We use Forbes’ description of the billionaires to classify 
them as heirs, entrepreneur-founders, and heir-entrepreneurs (people who 
inherited huge fortunes but greatly increased them). We  double-check in 
the 1994-97  issues of Forbes to verify the accuracy of our classification of 
each billionaire. (The I997 Forbes explicitly classifies billionaires as self- 
made or not.) Members of billionaire political dynasties (obtained from 
Forbes 1997) are classified as heirs. Dropping them does not change the 
results. Ambiguous classifications by Forbes are cross-checked with Who  i 
Who. If they are still ambiguous, these billionaires are assigned to a fourth, 
probably heir category. Including them and/or the heir-entrepreneurs in 
the heir category does not change the results. 
Our GDP and population data are from the World Bank, with data for 
Taiwan obtained from the website of that country’s government. Our data 364  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
on investment rates and education (human capital) are from the World 
Bank Growth Data used by, for example, Barro and Lee (1996). The politi- 
cal economy variables are from Holmes, Johnson, and Kirkpatrick (1997). 
Univariate statistics for these variables are shown in table 11A.  1. 
Canadian Data 
Our sample of large Canadian firms begins with the Financial Post 500, 
the largest  500 firms in  1988, ranked by  sales as listed in the Financial 
Post magazine.  Ownership  and minimal financial data are available for 
246 of these. 
Ownership data are from the Finuncial Post Survey  of  Industrials and 
the Financial Post  Survey  of  Energy and Mining Companies. These data 
are cross-checked against  Statistics Canada’s Directory  of  Intercorporate 
Ownership for 1989. Inconsistencies are resolved by checking proxy state- 
ments. For each firm, the total number of shareholder votes is calculated 
assuming that all warrants, convertibles, and stock options have been exer- 
cised. The total number of votes controlled by  the largest shareholder is 
calculated in a similar way. This is divided by the total number of votes to 
obtain the largest shareholder’s voting power. We define a firm as having 
a dominant shareholder if the largest single shareholder owns or controls 
Table 11A.1  Univariate Statistics for Country-Level Data 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Economy characteristics: 
Growth rate in GDP  (‘YO) 
Per capita GDP (U.S.$  X  1,000) 
Capital investment rate (%) 
Average years of education 
Economy capital ownership structure:a 
Business-entrepreneur billionaire 
Billionaire-heir wealth over GDP 
Political economy variables (1 = low,  5 
Level of government intervention 
Extent of regulations 
Trade barrier height 
FDI barrier height 
Index of overall tax burden 
Private-sector R&D over GDP 
wealth over GDP 
= high): 

















































Note: The sample is 39 countries, as listed in table  11.1, except for private-sector R&D over GDP, 
which is available for only 34 countries. Sample excludes the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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more than 20 percent of total voting rights. Where more than one share- 
holder is listed as having voting control over a trust, we  assign each an 
equal proportion  of  the votes. Firms with no dominant shareholder are 
classified as widely held. The name of the largest shareholder among those 
with stakes exceeding 20 percent is determined. Information from corpo- 
rate histories, proxies, the Blue Book of  Canadian Business, and Who>  Who 
allow us to determine the name of each firm’s founder. If the founder and 
the current major dominant shareholder are the same, we  call the firm 
entrepreneur controlled. If the current dominant shareholder has the same 
last name as the founder, we define the firm as heir controlled. 
Financial data are from the Toronto Globe and Mail’s InfoGlobe data- 
base and are available for 200 of our firms. We compare these Canadian 
firms with U.S. industries and with U.S. firms matched by industry, sales, 
and age (see details below). US. financial data are from the Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat database. We adjust fiscal year definitions of our Cana- 
dian firms to correspond to Compustat’s convention that annual reports 
dated before 15 June of year t are defined as year t - 1 data. 
All Canadian dollar amounts are converted to U.S. dollars. Monthly 
exchange rates are noon averages from the Bank of  Canada Review quar- 
terly issues. Using the average of the twelve monthly averages ending with 
the month of the fiscal year end, Canadian figures are converted to U.S. 
dollars. Numbers for Canadian companies that report in U.S. dollars are 
not adjusted. 
Industry classifications are made using the Standard Industrial Classi- 
fication (SIC) codes system of Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. 
U.S. rivals are defined as all U.S. firms belonging to the same industry 
(defined by three-digit SIC codes) as the Canadian firm. For each set of 
U.S. rivals, we  construct an industry profit rate by  adding up the total 
operating income of the firms and dividing this by the total of their sales. 
Many of our Canadian firms are not included in Compustat. For these, 
an industry classification was found in  Dun and Bradstreet’s Canadian 
Directory. Since the industry codes used by  Dun and Bradstreet are not 
identical to those used by Compustat, a conversion table was worked out 
using firms listed in both. The first three industry codes (in declining im- 
portance by sales in that industry) from Dun and Bradstreet were used in 
deriving the conversion table. U.S. matched-pair firms are the U.S. firms 
in the same three-digit industry as the Canadian firm in question for which 
the sum of the absolute values of the percentage differences in sales and 
firm age is minimized. 
Operating income is defined as earnings gross of depreciation, interest, 
and tax payments. This is scaled by either total assets or total sales. Sales 
growth is measured in U.S. dollars for Canadian and US. firms. To reduce 
distortions caused by extraordinary events or macroeconomic factors, we 
smooth our measure by taking the median of the industry-adjusted profit 366  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
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Table llA.2  Univariate Statistics for Canadian Firm-Level Data 
Variable 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Operating income over assets, 
1984-89: 
Mean of annual observations 
Median of annual observations 
Operating income over sales, 
198489: 
Mean of annual observations 
Median of annual observations 
Mean of annual observations 
Median of annual observations 
Growth in number of employees, 
Mean of annual observations 
Median of annual observations 
Growth in sales, 198G39: 
198489: 
Date of first incorporation 
Total sales in billions of 1988 U.S. 
"h of votes controlled by largest 
dollars 














































Source: Sample is 200 firms, as in table 11.4. All mean and median variables are deviations from US. 
industry averages by three-digit SIC. 
rates between 1984 and 1989 for each Canadian firm. The exchange rates 
at the beginning and the end of this period are almost identical at about 
$1.20 Canadian per US. dollar, despite swings in intermediate years. Since 
the median is usually calculated from six observations (an even number), 
after ordering the observations we define their median as the halfway point 
between the third and the fourth observations. We  use  the logarithm of 
total 1989 sales to measure firm size and the logarithm of the number of 
years since the firm's first incorporation date to measure firm age. This 
date is obtained from the Blue Book of  Cunadiun Business, Who? Who, fi- 
nancial reports, and corporate histories. 
Missing from this list of variables is a measure of stock market valua- 
tion. Many of the Canadian firms that we study have one or more classes 
of equity that do not trade publicly. It is not possible reliably to estimate 
variables such as q-ratios for these firms. Excluding these firms would re- 
sult in a very unrepresentative picture of the Canadian economy. Also, 
valuing firms that are included in control pyramids can be problematic as 
shares in other firms constitute large fractions of their assets. 
Univariate statistics for all our variables are given in table 11A.2. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  367 
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Comment  David M. Levy 
I have essentially one comment on the vastly instructive paper by Morck, 
Stangeland, and Yeung (MSY): Why do they constrain their analysis, both 
positive and normative,  to the mean  of a distribution? Of  course, this 
query is not directed specifically to MSY but to the literature of which 
they are such distinguished exemplars. 
Why a Regression Mean? 
The international data set used by MSY is of highly mixed quality. Or- 
dinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates-a  multiple-dimension 
generalization of a sample mean-are  highly sensitive to contamination 
of high-quality data by data of a lesser quality. To shelter their technique 
from the hard facts of data quality, MSY restrict their international regres- 
sions to forty-one countries. Perhaps techniques more robust to violations 
of ideal conditions than OLS might reveal information from an extended 
data set. 
What concerns me is that, in a context in which MSY attempt to find 
the effect of politically connected billionaires, their technique-driven ex- 
clusion of some countries may hide some enormously interesting questions 
of political stability. It can be argued, in particular, that central planning 
was a device by  which the politically connected exploited others-and 
thus central planning created political billionaires in terms of consump- 
tion if not measured income (Levy 1990). Thus, the fact of the breakdown 
of  the  planned  economies-justifying  their  exclusion from the regres- 
sions-is  precisely the kind of evidence of the effect of politically con- 
nected wealth for which MSY are looking. 
For  an example of  political  wealth and political  instability, consider 
MSY’s table 1  1.1 “politician billionaire wealth” series. I find it most illu- 
minating that the maximum of the series occurs with Indonesia! Newspa- 
per accounts tell us that it was precisely the concern of the ruling family 
for its own well-being to the exclusion of other considerations that moti- 
vated the recent upheavals. 
David M. Levy is associate professor of economics at George Mason University and a 
Thanks are due to Andrew Farrant for error detection. 
research associate of the Center for the Study of Public Choice. 370  Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung 
Why Mean Income? 
The dependent variable in MSY’s cross-country regressions is per capita 
income. The justification for this is twofold: (a) the data are available, and 
(6) traditional economic utilitarianism uses mean income as a serviceable 
scalar metric of well-being. I think that there is really only one justifica- 
tion-economic  utilitarianism  tells us what data we  ought to have col- 
lected. 
The consequence of mean income as metric is that it makes no differ- 
ence to whom  the income goes.  It makes  no difference  on this metric 
whether income is widely shared or concentrated in a few politically con- 
nected families. The reaction of many economists to this issue has been to 
renounce scalar metrics of well-being in favor of vectors, for example, to 
argue for a trade-off between “efficiency” and “equity” to take distribu- 
tional issues into account. 
Nonetheless, mean-based utilitarianism runs as deep as can be in mod- 
ern economics. Consider what we teach our students about the efficiency 
of competition and monopoly.  A competitive industry is more efficient 
than a single-price monopoly because the welfare triangle loss means that 
there is less income to divide between  producer and consumer. Thus, a 
perfectly discriminating firm is as efficient as a competitive industry pre- 
cisely because there is no welfare triangle loss (Robinson 1933). Distribu- 
tion of income bctween producers and consumers is irrelevant to welfare 
judgments. But, again, this is a simple property of means. 
Before utilitarianism was even named, a group of thinkers who moved 
seamlessly between  economics  and philosophy-Adam  Smith, William 
Paley,  and T. R. Malthus-argued  that the well-being  of  the  majority 
ought to be the metric by which we judge societies.’ A utilitarianism recen- 
tered to consider median well-being has the enormous appeal of making 
explicit the link  to political  stability  via the median-voter  approach  to 
democratic politics (Downs 1957). 
As  an illustration  of  how  a  median-based  welfare  evaluation  might 
modify our results, consider how the evaluation of competition and mo- 
nopoly would change. Let there be N consumers but only K firm owners, 
where N/2 > K 2 1. Thus, the median member of society is a consumer, 
and, to find a social rank, we look only at the consumer’s surplus. The rank- 
ing is  obvious: competition,  single-price  monopoly, perfect  discrimina- 
tion. Thus, the social ranking of competition and single-price monopoly 
would remain unchanged, but the perfect discrimination case would move 
from a tie for first to dead last. 
If  MSY were to think  about their model in terms of median income 
1.  Levy (1995) discusses Smith in this context; Hollander (1997, 830-31)  discusses Mal- 
thus’s median-based utilitarianism. Paley’s majoritarianism is clear at Paley (1  785, 61-67). Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth  371 
instead of mean  income, the link between political  stability-and  thus 
what countries have nice enough to data with which to work!-and  the 
underlying norm would seem to me to be more natural. 
Conclusion 
Economists unsatisfied with the use of mean income as a scalar metric 
of social well-being sometimes propose adding considerations of “equity.” 
If equity concerns are something that the political process addresses with 
a democratic procedure, then such equity considerations could be  more 
closely approximated by considering the well-being of the median member 
of society. 
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